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CHAPTER I: GENERAL INTRODUCTION OF THE THESIS 
1.1 Economic and academic relevance of family firms 
Found virtually in every sector of the world’s economies, family enterprises are the most common 
form of business entity in the world. They dominate economic activity across the world and are one 
of the main generators of sustainable wealth. It has been reported that in Brazil, Italy and Spain, 
over 70 percent of the businesses are controlled by families (Habbershon, 2006). Across Europe, 
about 70%-80% of enterprises are family businesses and they account for about 40%-50% of 
employment. Therefore, family firms have a significant impact on the economy and employment in 
several sectors and industries (Habbershon & Pistrui, 2002). Therefore, the importance of family 
businesses to a country’s economic well-being can not be questioned.  
Despite these facts, research on family firms has only existed since the mid 1970s (Wortman, 
1994). With only sporadic publications before 1975, the field has grown significantly since then 
(Jaskiewicz, 2006; Sharma, 2004; Zahra & Sharma, 2004).  
Scholars argue that family business research heavily borrows from other fields such as psychology, 
sociology, economics, and law (Bird, Welsch, Astrachan, & Pistrui, 2002; Sharma, 2004; Wortman, 
1994). Nowadays, there are numerous fields used to define and study the family firms’ behavior in 
different contexts, such as the resource based view, the agency theory, the stewardship theory 
etc… All these theories have allowed the study of family firms, but recently the field of family firms 
has built its own approach or framework to reach a better comprehension of family firms. This 
framework is SocioEmotional Wealth (SEW). It combines Behavioral Agency Theory (BAM) 
(Wiseman & Gómez-Mejía, 1998) with the importance that for family firms have non-economic 
goals, grouped under the SEW concept, to argue that SEW constitutes the primary reference point 
in family firm decision making. It also posits that unlike in non-family firms, in family firms decision 
making is primarily devoted to protect its SEW endowment (Gómez-Mejía et al., 1997; Gómez-
Mejía, L.R., Cruz, C., Berrone, P., & De Castro, J., 2011,; Berrone, P., Cruz, C., & Gómez-Mejía, 
L.R., 2012). In doing so, the SEW framework also brings important insights for management theory 
in general as it allows us to understand the impact that non-economic goals have in firm decision 
making processes.  
The present dissertation seeks to contribute to our understanding of the impact of SEW (i.e. non-
economic factors) in the decisions of family firms. It presents 3 studies that link family management 
and control of firms with entrepreneurial orientation, corporate social responsibility and the CEO 
level of satisfaction with the firm. By extension we aim at better understanding how non-economic 
utilities influence firm’s decision making. In order to do so we will use the SEW framework in 
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combination with other theories throughout the entire dissertation. Therefore the SEW framework 
can be seen as the central conceptual framework of the dissertation. 
A very relevant question, that has been the subject of many articles in the family firm literature, is 
what constitutes a family firm. 
1.2 Definition of family firms 
Perhaps one of the most discussed issues in the field is how to define a family enterprise. Although 
many researchers have tried to develop a satisfactory definition (Chua et al. 1999, Miller et al. 
2007), there is still no consensus about a widely accepted definition (Chrisman et al. 2005b). While 
some studies in the finance literature identify any public company where a family or a founder owns 
more than 5 percent as a family firm (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006), other studies define firms only as family firms if the first succession into 
the second generation has taken place (Bennedsen et al. 2007; Pérez-González, 2006). However, 
in most studies a family firm has been characterized as a firm that is controlled and usually 
managed by multiple family members, sometimes from multiple generations. 
A study conducted by the European Commission, Enterprise and Industry Directorate General in 
2008 identified more than 90 definitions of family firms only in Europe, which mainly require major 
family influence on ownership and management/strategic control. Other characteristics used to 
differentiate family businesses from non-family businesses are the active involvement of family 
members in the enterprise’s everyday activities (i.e., the formal or informal employment of family 
members in non-managerial positions), the enterprise’s contribution to the family’s income 
generation, and intergenerational considerations (i.e., the intention to ensure the enterprise’s 
sustainability beyond the entrepreneur’s (professional) lifetime). 
As indicated the two common elements employed in the literature to differentiate family from non-
family firms are ownership and management/strategic control. Only very few of the existing 
definitions do not refer to the ownership aspect. But even within this dimension differences can be 
found: 
· In some definitions, this criterion is not specified any further, i.e., it is just indicated that the
business is to be owned by the family.
· The majority of the definitions refer to a dominant ownership position, e.g., by requiring a
majority of (voting) shares or the ownership of more than 50 % of the shares/capital.
· In some definitions (i.e., in Cyprus, Finland, France, Portugal, Spain or the United Kingdom
as well as by the Family Business Network (FBN) International) a differentiation among
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enterprise types is conducted. So, while for partnerships or private limited companies a 
share of at least 50 % of family ownership is required, between 10 % and 25 % are 
sufficient for public limited companies (or very large enterprises). 
· One of the Danish definitions indicates that the family is to be the “largest owner”.
· According to Danish and French definitions the family not necessarily needs to hold direct
ownership but, for example, the involvement of funds (in which the family is participating) is
sufficient to satisfy the indicated ownership criterion.
The second most common element in the identified European definitions for family business 
concerns the strategic/managerial control of the enterprise. About ¾ of the definitions analyzed in 
the previous study include this aspect whereby a comparatively wide range of different 
requirements can be found: 
· “soft criteria”
 family relations affect the assignment of the management
 family indirectly runs the company
 “major family influence/dominance” of the management (in terms of strategic decisions)
 “significant proportion” of the enterprises’ senior management
 “most important decision” made by the family
 “family control” of the management of the enterprise
 at least 2 generations having had control over the enterprise
“hard criteria” (interestingly, also in those definitions requiring a certain number of family members 
represented in the management, no reference is made to the company size) 
 CEO has to be a family member
 1 family member is actively involved in the operative management of the company
 At least 1 family member is actively involved in the operative management of the company
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 More than 1 family member in the management
 CEO and at least 1 management team member stems from the family
 At least 2 directors/board members stem from the family
 At least 3 board or staff members stem from the family
 Majority of the management team stem from the family
The use of these different definitions (European Commission, Enterprise and Industry Directorate-
General, Viena, 2008) is a major problem in family firm research. Although studies analyze related 
topics, the use of different family firm definitions makes the comparability of the results obtained in 
different studies difficult. 
Chrisman et al. (2005b) in their review of the important trends in family firm research, present two 
approaches of how family firms are defined in the reviewed literature. They distinguish between the 
components-of-involvement approach and the essence approach. Although the components-of-
involvement approach treats family involvement as a sufficient condition in order to define a firm as 
a family firm, the essence approach treats it only as a necessary condition. Following the 
components-of-involvement approach, a firm can be defined as a family firm when a) a family is the 
owner, b) the firm is family-managed, or c) the firm is controlled by a family. If one of these three 
characteristics applies to a firm, it can be defined as a family firm. The essence approach is more 
restrictive and defines firms only as family firms when family involvement leads to distinctiveness 
and specific behaviors. Four main characteristics constitute the essence approach: 1) a family’s 
influence regarding the strategy of the firm, 2) a family’s vision and intention to keep control and 
hand the firm over to the next generation, 3) family firm behavior, and 4) distinctive “familiness” 
defined as resources and capabilities that are unique to the family's involvement and interactions in 
the business. In order to identify a firm as a family firm these characteristics would be required. 
In this dissertation, we use different definitions of family firms depending on the sample we are 
working with. Some definitions take into consideration just the ownership, others more restrictive 
also add the control and management elements 1. For example, in the second chapter, we use 
different ownership thresholds to identify family firms depending on whether the company is 
privately or publicly held. In this study we employ a sample of Spanish manufacturing firms. In 
concordance with previous research (e.g. Barontini and Caprio, 2005), family firm is defined as any 
firm where the family controls directly or indirectly more than 50 percent of the shares if the 
1 These are the observable characteristics of family influence on firms. That is why they have been commonly 
used in empirical research. Other aspects such as intergenerational influence or distinctive familiness are 
seldom captured (some exceptions exist like the F-PEC scale proposed by Klein et al. 2005). 
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company is privately held, or more than 10 percent of shares if the company is publicly traded. 
Because of the difficulties in gaining access to data on privately held family firms’ data, most of the 
existing evidence on the impact of SEW in family firms’ decision making have been conducted on 
publicly traded firms. Ownership is less disperse in privately held companies. Consequently, the 
percentage of family ownership in privately held companies necessary to guarantee family control 
and influence over business decisions should be greater. With a large majority of privately held 
companies in which the family owns more than 50% of the equity and even 100% (Cruz et al., 
2010) a minimum of 50% ownership is considered reasonable in privately held firms. For publicly 
held firms, a 10% ownership has been considered as a reasonably conservative minimum threshold 
(Gómez-Mejía, L. R., Makri, M., & Larraza Kintana, M., 2010). 
However, in the third chapter, in which we use a large sample of publicly traded European firms, we 
classified the company as a family firm if two criteria were met: a) an individual or a family group 
owned at least 20% of the shares during the whole period 2001-2010.2 b) there was at least one 
member of the family serving as Director in the Board. The two criteria were set based on previous 
research which shows: a) that controlling more than 20% of voting rights is enough for a 
shareholder or group of shareholders to exercise significant influence on a firm in a European 
context (Faccio and Lang, 2002); b) that this influence becomes even more significant if at least one 
family member is on the Board of Directors ( Anderson, R.C., Mansi, S.A.  & Reeb, D.V. , 2003; 
Gómez-Mejía, et al., 2003). 
In the fourth chapter, the sample is composed by 1500 Spanish small firms in high and medium 
technology manufacturing and service industries. All of them are privately held (Arosa, Iturralde y 
Maseda, 2010). In this case family firm is defined as any firm where the family controls directly or 
indirectly more than 50 percent of the shares consistency with the first chapter definition. As it will 
be shown, as a robustness check, we also define family management (FM) when family controls 
directly or indirectly more than 50 percent of the shares and the CEO of the firm is also family 
member. Furthermore, we also check our hypothesis with another restrictive definition of family firm: 
the family control (FC) that takes value 1 when family controls directly or indirectly more than 50 
percent of the shares and at least one family members are present on the board of the directors.  
Besides, one of the biggest challenges of developing a general definition is the heterogeneity of 
family firms (Arregle et al., 2007; Galve, 2002). Family firms are a unique group of organizations, 
but there are also differences within this group. The involvement of the family in the management 
and ownership structure of the firm is unique to each family firm and thus it cannot be seen as 
constant factor. This is why in this last chapter, we distinguish between different types of family 
2 Consistent with Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester and Canella (2007), we took 
as the focal family the ones with the most percentage of shares. 
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firms: Founder_family (firms that are family firms and the founder is still present in the management 
of the firm.) and Next_generation (family firms managed not by the founder but by his/her heirs). 
1.3 The role of non economic factors in family firms. 
The literature on family firms has always stressed that one element that distinguishes family from 
non-family firms is the importance that in the decision making of the former have no purely 
economic elements or aspects. In this vein, for example, Habbershon and Williams (1997) 
introduced the concept of “familiness”. It refers to the unique set of resources of a family business 
which arise from the interactions between the family system as a whole, the individual family 
members, and the business itself. Habbershon, Williams, and MacMillan (2003) noted that 
familiness can even be a source of competitive advantage. 
Besides, this familiness cannot be separated from its corporate culture. Corporate culture can be 
defined as the values, beliefs, and attitudes that influence individual and group behavior within a 
business organization (Miller 2000:22). Barney’s (1986:657) definition also adds assumptions and 
symbols as elements of corporate culture. Familiness overlaps with the corporate culture of a family 
business, as the founder’s and founder’s descendants’ own values, beliefs, assumptions, and 
attitudes are absorbed in the corporate culture and influence the way things are done in the 
business. When culture is transmitted, familiness will then be automatically transmitted as well. 
These constructs represent attempts to capture the emotional connection family owners feel for 
their firms and to portray the organization as a recipient of the family’s affective stock, which 
influences the psychological, behavioral, social, and cognitive aspects of managing the business. 
In addition to emotions, another noneconomic factor that is often mentioned in the literature as a 
distinguishing feature of family firms is how values idiosyncratic to the family permeate the 
organization (Dyer, 2003; Fletcher, 2000; Habbershon & Pistrui, 2002). The perpetuation of family 
values through the business (Handler, 1990), the preservation of family dynasty (Casson, 1999) 
and the conservation of the family’s social capital (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007) are 
frequently highlighted in the literature. It is defined as the “affective endowment” of family owners, 
including the family’s desire to exercise authority, enjoyment of family influence, maintenance of 
clan membership within the firm, the appointment of trusted family members to important posts, 
retention of a strong family identity, the continuation of family dynasty, etc. 
A third distinctive aspect of family firms noted in the literature concerns altruistic behavior among 
family owners, referring to their desire to cater to the welfare of the family unit. By exercising 
altruism family owners receive satisfaction by benefiting family employees independent of their 
relative contribution to the organization or their capacity to reciprocate in kind (Gomez et al, 2011). 
The importance of altruism has received renewed attention in the family business literature over the 
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last ten years (see for instance, Jorissen, Laveren, Martens, & Reheul, 2005; Lubatkin, Schulze, 
Ling, & Dino, 2005; Lubatkin, Durand, & Ling, 2007; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella, 
2007). 
In recent years Gómez-Mejía et al (2007) proposed to group all the non-economic factors that are 
relevant in family firms under the SEW label. According to these authors SEW encompasses “non-
financial aspects of the firm that meet the family's affective needs, such as identity, the ability to 
exercise family influence, and the perpetuation of the family dynasty” (pp. 106).  
But the proposal made by Gómez-Mejía and his co-authors in their 2007 piece goes beyond coining 
a new concept to group all those non-economic elements present in family firms. These authors 
consider SEW as the central element to understand and explain the different strategic behaviour of 
family firms. Using BAM (Wiseman & Gómez-Mejía, 1998) they argue that SEW is the main 
reference point to controlling families in family firms, such that their decisions are primarily directed 
towards SEW preservation. BAM integrates elements of prospect theory, behavioral theory of the 
firm and agency theory and considers decision makers are loss averse and evaluate their strategic 
alternatives relative to a reference point. In family firms, this reference point is SEW. Controlling 
families would prioritize those strategic alternatives that would protect SEW, even if it means to take 
more economic risk (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010). Thus the desire to 
preserve the family´s SEW is separate from efficiency or economic instrumentality considerations, 
such that SEW preservation activities are prioritized over other alternatives that may lead to better 
economic outcomes. Hence, their work provides a conceptual framework to understand the decision 
making process of family firms and how it deviates from the decisions made by non-family firms. At 
the same time it provides a new perspective to understand the role that non-economic objectives 
can have on decision making processes in companies. 
So far, research on family firms has firmly established that SEW preservation manifests as an 
essential drive in a variety of decision contexts including R&D, environmental investments, 
compensation, diversification and earnings management (Berrone et al., 2010; Chrisman and Patel, 
2012; Gomez-Mejía et al., 2011; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010). This evidence has shown the SEW 
framework as a valid conceptual referent to understand the behavior and decisions of family firms 
and has positioned this framework as the more prominent theoretical approach in today’s literature 
in family firms (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011; Berrone et al., 2012). 
Despite its relevance this conceptual framework is relatively young (2007). So, it is not surprising 
that most of the research on family businesses generated to date has focused on evaluating and 
determining the validity of the basic tenets of this approach. As noted above these postulates have 
been refuted. 
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However, as a result of all this work of validation and consolidation, and following a logical process 
in any field of knowledge, some scholars have challenged some aspects of the conceptual 
framework that need to be developed with greater precision in order to build a more accurate 
conceptual framework. One that better accommodates the heterogeneity of behaviors and activities 
observed in family businesses.  
The most questioned aspects are: 
Monolithic concept. This was firstly questioned by the FIBER model (Berrone et al.2012).By its very 
nature, the concept of SEW is multidimensional (Berrone et al, 2012). Based on the family business 
literature and basic social science disciplines that support it, Berrone et al (2012) propose that there 
are five major dimensions of SEW that may be derived from prior research. They would collectively 
label these five dimensions as FIBER.  
Family control and influence (F). The first dimension refers to the control and influence of family 
members. One key characteristic that distinguishes family firms is that family members exert control 
over strategic decisions (Chua et al., 1999; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003b). 
Family members’ identification with the firm (I). The second dimension addresses the close 
identification of the family with the firm. Numerous family business scholars contend that the 
intermeshing of family and business gives rise to an inherently unique identity within family firms 
(e.g., Berrone et al., 2010; Dyer & Whetten, 2006). 
Binding social ties (B). The third dimension refers to family firms’ social relationships. Recent 
research by Cruz, Justo, and De Castro (2012) argues that SEW provides kinship ties with some of 
the same collective benefits that arise in closed networks, including collective social capital, 
relational trust (Coleman, 1990), and feelings of closeness and interpersonal solidarity (Uzzi, 1997). 
Emotional attachment (E). The fourth dimension deals with the affective content of SEW and refers 
to the role of emotions in the family business context. Although emotions are an “integral and 
inseparable part of everyday organizational work” (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1998, p. 98), in 
organizations where family relationships dominate, there is a longer history and knowledge of 
shared experiences and past events that converge to influence and shape current activities, events, 
and relationships. 
Renewal of family bonds to the firm through dynastic succession (R). The fifth and last dimension of 
SEW refers to the intention of handing the business down to future generations. Indeed, Zellweger 
and Astrachan (2008), and Zellweger, Kellermanns, et al. (2012) suggest this transgenerational 
sustainability as one of the central aspects of SEW. 
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Once identified that the SEW can be a multidimensional concept, questions arise for example about 
what is the role of the different dimensions, or whether they always generate the same kind of 
response from family businesses, whether they can evolve or change over time, or whether family 
firms can pay more attention to some dimensions and less to others. 
Family firms may vary in the importance and value that attach to those different elements of SEW, 
thereby producing different behaviors among family firms (Miller and LeBreton-Miller, 2014). SEW 
priorities may also vary among family members within a firm, or they also may vary across the life 
cycle of a family in a firm: founders may desire a robust business to pass on to later generations, 
whereas later generations may wish to benefit from the wealth and community status wrought by 
their family firm (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013b; Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 2005). All this 
discussion has been engendered recently, and therefore it is a largely unexplored area. Family firm 
research would benefit from research that seeks to identify how SEW dimensions interact which 
each other, and how family firms manage to protect those different SEW dimensions or how those 
SEW priorities evolve across generations and members of the same family. 
Related to the monolithic concept is the issue of whether SEW should be considered as a flow or as 
a stock. Chua, Chrisman and Di Massis (2015) have recently conceptualized SEW as a function of 
both stocks and flows, and have identified the limitations of earlier conceptualizations that mostly 
focused on stocks while neglecting changes in socioemotional endowments through flows. This 
idea of SEW as a flow connects with the previously noted idea of SEW as a dynamic endowment 
whose value and relevance may vary over time and across generations. 
Cause-effect connection. Another challenge facing by the SEW approach is the problem of 
connecting cause and effect. Sometimes outcomes attributed to the preservation of family SEW 
may be caused by factors that have little to do with those intentions. Limiting corporate social 
responsibility, entrepreneurial activities, internationalization, risk taking… may be motivated not only 
by SEW concerns, but the quest for greater short-term financial returns (Gómez-Mejía, Makri, 
Hoskisson, Sirmon and Campbell, 2010; Gómez-Mejía, et al. 2010). Thus, the connection between 
motives and rewards, and among each of them, becomes difficult to disentangle. In this sense, 
future research would benefit from moving beyond final performance outcomes and pay a closer 
examination of motives behind the decisions being made. 
Context. SEW have multiple dimensions that may interact with each other and with economic 
benefits and firm value (economic wealth) in different ways depending on the context and time 
being considered (Kellermanns, Eddleston, and Zellweger, 2012; Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2013; 
Naldi, Cennamo, Corbetta, and Gómez-Mejía, 2013). For example, Chrisman and Patel (2012: 1) 
found that “when performance is below aspiration levels family goals and economic goals will tend 
to converge. In this situation R&D investments of family firms are expected to increase and the 
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variability of those investments decrease, relative to non-family firms.” So, the pivotal reference 
point for family owners will shift from SEW preservation to economic considerations. Consequently, 
it is very important to analyze the moderating role of different context related variables that could 
change the preferences of family firms.  
Measurement. Probably the most important challenge the SEW approach is facing nowadays has to 
do with the measurement of SEW. To date most of the empirical evidence on the SEW framework 
has been obtained comparing family and non-family firms. According to the large literature on family 
firms, these firms are characterized by the importance controlling families attach to the preservation 
of the non-economic utilities grouped under the SEW label. However, in most of the previous 
research SEW preferences are not assessed directly. For the most part they are constrained to the 
dummy variable that separates family from non-family firms. Further, the family character of the firm 
is rarely measured by stated family motivations but instead by examining governance variables of 
family involvement in ownership and management. Hence, more fine-grained information about the 
preferences, motivations, and social behavior of family firm owners and executives would probably 
help to reach a better understanding of the importance of SEW and its protection in family firms, 
and how it evolves over time and generations. There are already some attempts to move forward in 
terms of measurement. For instance, a review and analysis of the family business research 
literature from Miller and Le-Breton Miller (2014) leads them to suggest that parsing SEW’s 
outcomes into groups that align roughly with the agency and stewardship perspectives (i.e. 
“restricted” and “extended”) would allow researchers to enrich their use of the construct. Another 
attempt comes from Chua, Chrisman and Di Massis (2015), who have also make a closer look at 
the SEW, conceptualizing it as a function of stocks and flows and identifying the limitations of earlier 
conceptualizations that mostly focused on stocks while neglecting changes in socioemotional 
endowments through flows. 
The previously noted discussion on the SEW dimensions and its evolution and weight in each 
family business, has further fueled the debate on the importance of measuring the SEW. Direct 
measures of SEW and particularly its constituent dimensions, would be instrumental to better 
comprehend for example how SEW is generated, how it evolves or how it varies between 
generations. 
In this context, this thesis seeks to contribute to knowledge about family businesses and the 
construction of a theory about their behavior, through three studies examining different aspects of 
family businesses. Our aim is to assess the importance of non-economic factors (listed in the 
concept of SEW) in decisions of family businesses through the lenses provided by the SEW 
framework. In doing so, we seek to provide further evidence and theoretical arguments to build a 
richer framework to analysis and achieve a greater understanding of the phenomenon under study. 
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In this vein the thesis considers different moderating variables: high technology industries (study 1 
and 2), declining performance (1, 2 and 3 studies) or national distance (study 2). The thesis also 
takes into consideration the multi-dimensional character of the SEW and how these dimensions 
determine the response to pressure from stakeholders (different response to external than internal: 
image versus control) (study 2): Finally, SEW evolution and some of its dimensions, through 
generations (study 3) or the indirect SEW measurement through the effect of financial performance 
on overall CEO satisfaction (study 3). 
1.4 Chapters development: Addressing specific research gaps 
While research has established the role of SEW in shaping family firm behavior, there are still, as it 
is going to be shown in the following chapters of the present dissertation in more detail, some 
issues related to SEW that deserve further attention. Trying to solve some of the problems facing by 
this theory, we will integrate the central tenents of the SEW framework with other theories that 
enrich their content and help explain certain behaviors of the family businesses. Specifically, it is 
explored how SEW preservation concerns may impact entrepreneurial orientation (EO) (chapter 2) 
and corporate social responsibility (CSR) (chapter 3) in family vis a vis non-family firms. The role of 
some important contingency variables (namely: environmental dynamism, hazards faced by the 
firm, family stage, or firm size) are also examined. These variables modulate the importance of 
family’s SEW preservation preferences as the primary frame of reference in the management of the 
firm. Lastly, we address the question of how important SEW and its preservation is for family firms, 
and how its relevance varies across generations. More specifically in the last chapter of the 
dissertation (chapter 4), we analyze how the satisfaction with the progress of the company differs 
between family and non family firms. If, as argued above, SEW and its preservation is so important 
for family firms, the impact of pure economic outcomes (i.e. past financial performance) on the 
satisfaction of family firm owners should be less dependent of such economic performance. 
Chapter 2: Entrepreneurial orientation (EO) 
Entrepreneurship is crucial if a firm is willing to create new capabilities (Zahra, 1996; Zahra et al., 
2004). The ability to renew a firm’s product portfolio through radical innovation is important for 
growth and long term survival, even in industries that are not technology-intensive. While research 
on entrepreneurship in family firms is increasing (Carr and Sequeira 2007; Naldi et al., 2007; Kraus 
et al., 2012), the role of family involvement in the entrepreneurial process remains under-
researched (Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2006). The interaction between family and business has a 
significant impact on the decisión making process and entrepreneurial activities in family firms 
(Nordqvist et al. 2008). Moreover, recently, Miller (2011) stressed that the issue of context may 
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influence EO. He stated that, ‘‘a good way of making context precise is to investigate a particular 
organization type’’ (Miller 2011, p. 9). In this study, we meet the needs of this call by investigating 
family businesses as a particular organizational type and including environmental and 
organizational moderators because we believe the intersection between family business literature 
and entrepreneurship literature (Uhlaner et al. 2012) could change depending on the context. The 
second chapter investigates the influence of non-economic drivers, represented by the SEW, on the 
entrepreneurial orientation (EO) of family firms. It will examine how SEW can influence family firms’ 
commitment to entrepreneurially-oriented activities, and how their level of commitment is moderated 
by the technological intensity of the sector and firm performance.  
The socio-emotional wealth (SEW) pertains to the non-economic aspects of family firms and could 
reflect both positive and negative consequences of these non-economic aspects. The findings of 
the study show that EO varies among family firms depending on the context. 
The basic notion pervading most research on family firms is that key managerial decisions are 
driven, irrespective of efficiency or economic instrumentality considerations, by a desire to preserve 
and enhance the family’s SEW, which becomes their main reference point (Gómez-Mejía et al. 
2007). For that reason, we introduce SEW on the EO– family firms relationship because it provides 
insight into how family firms exploit their resources (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2011). Indeed, in private 
family firms, firm resources are often used inefficiently due to SEW considerations (Cruz et al. 
2012). By their own nature, family firms are characterized by a wide range of emotions and 
interpersonal linkages which may engender parental altruism (Schulze et al. 2003a) or managerial 
entrenchment (Gomez-Meija et al. 2001). Thus, family firms often face inefficiencies as a result of 
their SEW preservation. Consecuently, while EO appears to be good for business performance, it 
may lead to a loss of SEW for family firms. Thus, in spite of the potential economic benefits 
associated with EO, fear of losing SEW could temper the family firm’s investment in 
entrepreneurially-oriented activities. In other words, the fear of losing the SEW may convert the 
positive influence of familiness in a weakness due to the lack of entrepreneurial orientation (Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2007). 
Moreover, we explore how environmental and organizational conditions affect the link between 
family ownership and EO. For instance, technology-intense industries are dynamic environments in 
which firms need to be highly flexible and quick to implement change (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2013). 
Thus, to remain competitive, firms need to place continuous emphasis on EO (O’Brien 2003), which 
is therefore deemed essential to survival in technology-intense industries. Family firms in more 
technology-intense industries exhibit similar EO levels to those of non-family firms. In less 
technology-intense industries, however, family firms are significantly less entrepreneurially oriented 
than non-family firms, the reason being that, in technology-intense environments, failure to invest in 
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entrepreneurship is riskier than actually making the investment. So, for firms competing in 
technologically demanding industries, investment in entrepreneurship is the price they have to pay 
to remain competitive. 
As regards the organizational conditions, we also suggest that threats to firm survival, and thereby 
to SEW, may lead family firms to pay more attention to EO in times of economic difficulties. We 
expected the reference point for family firms to shift from SEW protection to economic 
considerations in the face of economic difficulties. Nevertheless, the data does not support my 
previous expectation. The fact that we continue to find a lower degree of EO, irrespective of such 
problems signals that SEW protection is an enduring characteristic of family firms and significantly 
drives their decisions. 
Chapter 3: Corporate social responsibility 
Among the many issues addressed by family scholars, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has 
received increased attention lately, nourishing a growing stream of inquiry. This interest in CSR 
goes hand in hand with a growing interest on understanding whether the idiosyncratic nature of 
family businesses is reflected in how they relate to external environments; in other words, in how 
family principals manage the extended set of stakeholders that constitutes the firm. However, 
despite the efforts in disentangling the role of the family dimension in the adoption of social 
initiatives (i.e., actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interest of the firm and 
that which is required by law [McWilliams and Siegel, 2001: 117]), there is a lack of agreement 
about whether family firms are more or less socially responsible.  
The third chapter examines whether family firms are more socially responsible than their nonfamily 
counterparts and explores the conditions in which this difference in social behavior occurs. We 
argue that family firms, given their SEW protection bias, have a positive effect on social dimensions 
linked to external stakeholders, yet have a negative impact on internal social dimensions. Thus, 
family businesses can show a different behavior with different stakeholders and they may give 
preference to one SEW dimensions than others. In doing so, we expand stakeholder theory by 
providing fine-grained arguments and more evidence about the role of diverse principals in enacting 
varying responses to stakeholder pressures. So, we are combining the stakeholder theory of family 
businesses in terms of the creation and preservation of SEW, which brings the attention to the 
relevance of factors beyond simple financial objectives. The approach provides an integrated 
framework to explain the higher levels of social responsibility found in family businesses in external 
stakeholders and lower levels in the internal stakeholders, suggesting that family firms can 
simultaneously “be good and bad”.  
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The literature presents several reasons for the claim that family firms exhibit an innate motivation to 
satisfy the demands of external stakeholders. First, since social and reputational sanctions affect 
not only the company but also the family name (Adams, Taschian, & Shore, 1996; Dyer & Whetten, 
2006; Ward, 1987), family firms should be expected to be particularly concerned about legitimacy 
and reputation. They are therefore more likely to be responsive to external claims to avoid being 
stigmatized as an irresponsible corporate citizen, even if there are no direct financial rewards for 
doing so. For this reason, Zellweger and Nason (2008) argued that the level of analysis when 
understanding stakeholder relationships in family businesses should include not only the individual 
and family but also the society at large. 
Second, family firms have a natural tendency to create and protect long-term relationships with 
external stakeholders like suppliers and customers in order to accumulate social capital and 
reserves of goodwill (Carney, 2005). These relationships may also serve as a form of social 
insurance, protecting the firm’s assets in times of crisis (Godfrey, 2005), so that when damage 
occurs, stakeholders are more likely to give the firm the benefit of the doubt. Third, because family 
firms often enjoy a long-time horizon and are not pressured by short term results, they are more 
likely to adopt patient strategies that involve building relationships with stakeholders (Miller & Le 
Breton-Miller, 2005). 
One interesting issue that has seldom been explored is the family’s reaction to key stakeholders 
(such as nonfamily shareholders) that may threaten family control. Consistent with the view that 
loss of control is associated with a loss of SEW, Martin, Makri and Gómez-Mejía (2011) argue that 
family owners are more likely to come into conflict with other shareholders (the internal ones) who 
may disagree with strategic decisions favored by the family. 
We also suggest that institutional and organizational conditions act as catalysts in the relationship 
between firm type and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Moreover, while national standards 
and industry conditions influence the degree of CSR in nonfamily firms, these factors do not affect 
family firms. However, family firms’ social activities are more sensitive to declining organizational 
performance. 
Chapter 4: Family CEO Satisfaction with the firm 
Lastly, studies in the strategic management and economics areas have shown that companies may 
strongly react to whether or not they have performed as expected. The behavioral theory of the firm 
uses aspirations as one of its key categories and argues that firms continually adjust their behavior 
in reaction to how satisfied they are with past performance (Lant and Shapira 2008). Prospect 
theory is one of the main behavioral utility models proposed as alternatives to the expected utility 
model of decision making under risk (Starmer, 2000). An important implication of prospect theory is 
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that the way economic agents subjectively frame an outcome or transaction in their mind affects 
the utility they expect or receive, and thus affect their overall satisfaction with the company. 
In the last chapter, it is argued that family firms may react to past performance in a somewhat 
different way compared to nonfamily firms. The family business literature has long stressed the 
unique characteristics and peculiarities of family firm identity (Kepner, 1983; Kets de Vries, 1993; 
Westhead, et al., 2002). A common ground in this literature is the argument suggesting that the 
preservation of the nonfinancial aspects or “affective endowments” of family owners (SEW) is the 
most salient aspect of the family firm identity. As such, it is expected differences between family and 
non family firms in the general satisfaction with the firms. Prospect theory suggests that loss 
aversion would make the family reluctant to evaluate the satisfaction with the firm based just on the 
past financial performance, but to consider the non-economic factors (i.e. SEW). Thus, the impact 
of past financial performance on satisfaction in family firms is expected to be lower because for 
these firms the SEW or non economic goals are very important in the subjective evaluation of 
satisfaction.  
A key concept in the family business is the generation involved in the business. When the SEW 
concept is projected on a generational perspective (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007) it is emphasized that 
attitudes of family members may differ across generations, thus affecting their capacity to influence 
the company’s strategic direction (Sonfield & Lussier, 2004). Dyer (1988) and McConaughy and 
Phillips (1999) note the differences between first and following generations in family firms. 
According to the SEW perspective, the degree of family identification, influence and personal 
investment in the firm changes as the company evolves across generations (Gersick et al., 1997; 
Schulze et al., 2003). In this vein, strategic choices are more likely to be driven by economic 
considerations in later generations (Gómez-Mejía et al, 2007; Chen et al, 2010). The emphasis on 
preserving the family’s socioemotional wealth lessens as the firm moves through generations and 
that financial considerations become more important. Thus, in second or following generations, the 
presence of SEW, should be lower than in the first generation (Gómez-Mejía et al, 2007). For next 
generations, the SEW perspective is not as important as in the first generation, ownership 
structures tend to be more dispersed and they try to professionalize in order to keep competitive. 
Thus, we show that next generations will behave as non family firms because the presence of SEW 
is diluted over time and the level of general satisfaction will be more influenced by the past financial 
performance.  
In a similar vein, threats to firm survival, and thereby to SEW, may lead family firms to pay more 
attention to economic goals in times of economic difficulties. Previous studies have largely 
neglected the role of contextual factors that amplify or mute the relationship between past 
performance and satisfaction. So, we will also analyze the effect of negative firm performance since 
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this is a key variable in understanding the decision making and it is shown to have an impact on 
family owners’ SEW preservation goals (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Thus, when performance is 
negative, firms may respond by giving more importance to economic goals but this is only 
supported for the second and next generation family firms. When these family firms are through 
economic difficulties, they will give more importance to economic performance to the fear of losing 
everything. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
The dissertation is structured as follows: Firstly, we present the second chapter examining how 
socio-emotional factors can influence family firms’ commitment to entrepreneurially oriented 
activities, and how such effect is moderated by the industry’s technological intensity and the family 
firm’s performance. Secondly, we empirically study whether family firms behave more social 
responsibly than their non-family counterparts, and explores under which conditions this difference 
in social behavior changes. More specifically, we argue that family firms, given its strong emphasis 
on SEW elements, have a positive effect in social dimensions linked to external stakeholders and 
yet, they have negative impact on internal social dimensions. Thirdly, we test empirically the 
contrasting arguments developed regarding the effect of past performance on CEO satisfaction in 
family and non-family firms and within family firms, taking into account also the performance 
context. Lastly, we report and discuss the results, outline the implications of our study and conclude 
with a general assessment of the limitations and avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER II: ENTREPRENEURIAL ORIENTATION IN FAMILY FIRMS: THE MODERATING ROLE OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL INTENSITY AND PERFORMANCE 
2.1 Introduction 
 Entrepreneurship is crucial for firms wishing to create new capabilities (Zahra, 1996; Zahra et al., 
2004). Even in less technology-intense sectors, the ability to renew its product portfolio through radical 
innovation is important for a firm’s growth and long-term survival. According to Miller (1983:771), an 
entrepreneurial firm is one that “engages in product-market innovation, undertakes somewhat risky 
ventures and is first to come up with proactive innovations, beating competitors to the punch”. Further 
studies have shown that entrepreneurship increases revenue, empowers employees and improves 
profitability (Barrett and Weintein, 1998; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Zahra, 1996). The centrality of 
entrepreneurship to firm growth and performance has given rise to a growing area of research focused on 
entrepreneurial orientation (EO) which includes the strategy-making practices used to identify and pursue 
opportunities arising in the environment (Dess and Lumpkin, 2005). In its classic conceptualization, EO is a 
combination of three dimensions: innovativeness, proactiveness and risk-taking (Covin and Slevin, 1989; 
Covin and Wales, 2012; Zahra and Covin, 1995), although some authors, such as Lumpkin and Dess 
(1996) and Lumpkin et al. (2009), propose autonomy and competitive aggressiveness as further critical 
dimensions of EO. While the positive relationship between EO and performance, especially in technology-
intense settings, appears firmly established (Rauch et al., 2009), there is room for more research on why 
some firms are more entrepreneurially-oriented than others. 
 Prior research has stressed that the enhancement of EO is crucially dependent on the preferences 
and goals of those who control the firm and therefore have the power to influence firm decisions; namely, 
the owners and managers (Fini et al., 2010; Hornsby et al., 2002; Zahra and Filatochev, 2004; Zahra et al.,  
2009). A very important type of controlled firm are family firms (Colli et al., 2003; Habbershon and Williams, 
1999; Habbershon and Pistrui, 2002; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).   
 While research on entrepreneurship in family firms is increasing (Carr and Sequeira 2007; Naldi et 
al., 2007; Kraus et al., 2012), the role of family involvement in the entrepreneurial process remains under-
researched (Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2006) and there are two contradictory streams of thought within 
the extant literature. While some studies depict family firms as a context in which entrepreneurship 
flourishes as a result of kinship ties and the long-term nature of the business (Ward, 1987; Zahra, et al., 
2004; Zahra, 2012), others view them as too conservative and inflexible to take the risk associated with 
entrepreneurship and innovation (Autio and Mustakallio, 2003; Morris, 1998; Zahra, 2005; Chrisman and 
Patel, 2012; Nieto, Santamaria and Fernandez,2015 ). Simply put, there is a lack of consensus on whether 
family-firm characteristics help or hinder entrepreneurial activities (Short et al., 2009). Perhaps the reason 
behind the contradictory findings is the relative absence of socio-emotional wealth (SEW) considerations 
as a key factor in EO. Accordingly, this study uses the lens provided by the SEW framework (Gómez-Mejía 
et al., 2007; Berrone et al., 2010) to explore and directly compare family and non-family firms’ EO levels, 
and proposes SEW preservation as the primary reason for the greater reluctance to undertake EO 
activities found in family firms in relation to non-family firms,.  
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Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) defined socio-emotional wealth (SEW) as the “affective endowment” of family-
firm owners, including the family’s desire to wield power and influence, maintain clan membership within 
the firm, appoint trusted family members to key posts, retain a strong family identity, continue the family 
dynasty, etc. They argued that family firm owners’ decisions regarding firm strategy are driven by a 
preference to preserve SEW. This urge is independent of efficiency or economic instrumentality 
considerations, such that SEW preservation takes priority over alternatives that could produce better 
economic outcomes. Research on family firms has firmly established SEW preservation as a key driver in 
a variety of decision contexts including R&D, environmental investments, compensation, 
internationalization, diversification and earnings management (Berrone et al., 2010; Chrisman and Patel, 
2012; Gomez-Mejía et al., 2011; Fernandez, and Nieto, 2005; Sanchez-Bueno and Usero, 2014; Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2010) but it has not, to date, been linked with EO.  
While SEW preservation is important to family firms, this does not rule out the consideration of economic 
factors in their decision-making. The literature on socio-emotional wealth suggests that family firms are 
loss averse and, thus, would be willing to give up control if failure to do so would threaten firm survival 
(Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Hence, while SEW preservation is an ongoing 
concern for family firms, its importance varies with the competitive environment (i.e. high technology 
industries) and changing organizational characteristics (i.e. fluctuations in firm performance). More 
specifically, the issue of SEW preservation will be less crucial in family firms operating in more technology-
intense sectors. Innovation and entrepreneurship are pivotal in high-tech industries and investment in 
these areas is widely considered to be a key factor in gaining and sustaining a competitive advantage 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2013). In such a context, a lack of entrepreneurial orientation may constitute a risk 
and threat to firm survival. Thus, in terms of EO levels, we expect to find a much smaller gap between 
family and non-family firms in high-tech than in low-tech industries. Also, if a family firm’s survival is 
threatened by deteriorating performance, its owners will be more willing to cede control and invest in 
entrepreneurial activities that might improve their competitive position. Hence, we expect economic 
downturns to shift the balance towards EO for family firms. Simply put, the pivotal point of reference for 
family-firm owners will shift from SEW preservation to economic considerations in a context of economic 
hardship.  
 This paper makes several contributions to the literature. Firstly, it employs the SEW framework to 
enrich the debate on how family ownership affects EO and thereby paper increases our knowledge 
regarding the preferences of family owners with respect to investment in entrepreneurial activities. 
Secondly, using a contingency approach, it examines how the technological intensity of the industry and 
any economic difficulties facing the firm may moderate the gap in EO activity between family and non-
family firms. Third, the paper adds to the growing literature on SEW preservation as a driving force of 
strategic decisions in family firms, which may weaken in response to contextual factors (Gómez-Mejía et 
al., 2010; Berrone et al., 2010). While SEW preservation is an unquestionable goal in family firms, a key 
ongoing debate in the family firm literature revolves around how these firms balance economic against 
non-economic goals. The results of this paper may provide additional evidence to help understand this 
balancing act, while at the same time responding to the recent call for the consideration of  contextual 
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factors in explaining heterogeneity among family firms (De Massis et al., 2013). The paper enhances the 
existing literature by considering a representative sample including both publicly- and non-publicly-traded 
industrial Spanish firms. 
The paper is structured as follows: after a brief review of the literature on entrepreneurial orientation and 
family firms, we develop our hypotheses and outline our research methods. We then report and discuss 
our results, outline the implications of our study, and conclude by indicating its limitations and suggesting 
avenues for future research. 
2.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
An entrepreneurial orientation appears an unavoidable option for firms hoping to prosper in 
competitive business environments (Eggers et al., 2013).While the implications of entrepreneurial 
processes for firm growth and performance have become the topic of many studies (Lumpkin and Dess, 
1996; Rauch, 2009; Zahra et al., 1999), little consideration has been given to other factors (Wales et al., 
2013), such as the preferences and goals of key decision makers (e.g. Fini et al., 2010).  
The organizational form of family firms is unique, in that they are likely to be guided by a very 
particular set of motives including the preservation of SEW, and the stock of affect-related value that the 
family has invested in the firm (Gómez-Mejia et al., 2007; Xi et al., forthcoming). The basic notion 
pervading most research on family firms is that key managerial decisions are driven, irrespective of 
efficiency or economic instrumentality considerations, by a desire to preserve and enhance the family’s 
SEW, which becomes their main reference point (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). The model predicts that 
family-firm owners are “loss averse” with respect to SEW, that is, rather than see their SEW diminish, they 
will opt for choices that might threaten their economic wealth. Previous research has documented SEW 
preservation as a key driving force in family firms, influencing decisions in areas such as R&D, Corporate 
Social Responsibility, compensation, diversification or earnings management (Chrisman and Patel, 2012; 
Cruz et al., 2014; Gomez-Mejía et al., 2011; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010). 
It is our contention that SEW preservation motives also drive the level of EO hold by family firms. 
While EO appears to be good for business performance, it may lead to a loss of SEW. EO entails 
promoting innovation, taking more risks, being more proactive and aggressive in the market in order to stay 
ahead of the competition, all of which is usually accompanied by greater employee autonomy. More often 
than not, these activities involve new projects and thus the need to capture new funds and recruit outside 
talent. For innovative purposes, for instance, firms often need not only external funds but also fresh talent 
to bring in new ideas. More specifically, studies have found that  a stronger presence of non-family 
managers and additional financial resources are crucial to secure continued entrepreneurship (Salvato, 
2004; Steier, 2003; Carney, 2005). While all these actions can benefit firm performance in the long run, 
they also threaten the family’s ability to maintain control. Thus, while the presence of non-family members 
adds new perspectives and ideas, it challenges the family’s ability to exercise control. Furthermore, despite 
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the importance of external capital for firm growth, family firms prefer to avoid external control by financial 
institutions (Shulze et al., 2003a). EO activities may also have a negative effect on key elements of SEW, 
like affective commitment and family cohesion (Marchisio et al., 2010). Thus, in spite of the potential 
economic benefits associated with EO, fear of losing SEW could temper the family firm’s investment in 
entrepreneurially-oriented activities. We therefore expect family firms to present lower levels of EO than 
their non-family counterparts. Formally stated, our first hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Family firms are less entrepreneurially oriented than non-family firms.  
 
2.2.1Technological intensity, Past Performance and EO 
 While the level of EO in family firms is expected to be lower, on average, than that of non-family 
firms (as per H1), it may vary with the technological intensity of the sector. Technology-intense industries 
are dynamic environments in which firms need to be highly flexible and quick to implement change 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2013). Thus, to remain competitive, firms need to place continuous emphasis on EO 
(O’Brien, 2003), which is therefore deemed essential to survival in technology-intense industries. As 
mentioned earlier, EO carries a risk of SEW loss for the family firm, but, in technology-intense industries, 
failure to invest in new projects may threaten firm survival and loss of SEW altogether. Family control of 
the firm, a cornerstone of family SEW, may be at risk if the firm engages in EO because it may involve 
hiring outside talent and finding external capital and resources (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011). Nevertheless, 
family members will be willing to forfeit a degree of control if acting otherwise is likely to threaten the firm’s 
survival (Cruz et al., 2014; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). When survival is threatened, family goals and 
economic goals tend to converge and families will give more salience to economic factors (Chrisman and 
Patel, 2012). Therefore, given that EO appears to be instrumental for firm long-term survival in technology-
intense sectors (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2013), we expect family firms operating in such sectors to be more 
willing to relinquish some control by investing in EO in order to protect the firm from competitors. Thus, we 
expect to find a narrower gap between family and non-family firms in technology-intense industries. 
Formally stated, our second hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2:  The EO gap family and non-family firms is smaller in technology-intense industries. 
 
 In a similar vein, threats to firm survival, and thereby to SEW, may lead family firms to pay more 
attention to EO in times of economic difficulties. The behavioral agency model (Wiseman and Gómez-
Mejía, 1998) suggests that decision-makers are loss averse and that losses are gauged in a subjective 
framework depending on the utilities that are most critical to the parties involved. When the survival of a 
family firm is under threat, and there is a danger of SEW being lost altogether, the owners will shift their 
focus towards an economic point of reference. Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007), for instance, found that family-
owned olive oil mills were more likely to join coops (and suffer losses in SEW by ceding control to the 
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coop) under conditions of low performance. Similarly, Gómez-Mejía et al., (2010) report that publicly-traded 
family-owned firms are more likely to diversify (and dilute family control) when ROA is poor. In other words, 
when performance deteriorates, total losses in terms of earnings and SEW are possible. If the firm has to 
file for bankruptcy, the family will lose, not only income, but also its accumulated SEW. Additionally, 
Chrisman and Patel (2012: 1) found that “when performance is below aspiration levels family goals and 
economic goals will tend to converge. In this situation R&D investments of family firms are expected to 
increase and the variability of those investments decrease, relative to non-family firms.” Based on these 
findings, we expect that, when declining performance leads to economic difficulties, the pivotal reference 
point for family owners will shift from SEW preservation to economic considerations. In terms of EO, we 
expect that the family will be more willing, in times economic difficulties, to engage in entrepreneurially-
oriented activities in an effort to reverse their fortunes. Therefore, under economic difficulties, the EO of 
family firms will be more similar to that of non-family firms. Formally stated, our third hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 3: The EO gap between family and non-family firms narrows in times of economic difficulties 
2.3 Methods 
2.3.1 Data collection and sample 
The above hypotheses are tested on a sample of 401 plants in diverse manufacturing industries. The data 
were obtained by means of a series of in-depth personal interviews conducted in 2007, as part of a 
research project directed towards the analysis of the organizational practices of Spanish manufacturing 
firms with more than 50 employees. To ensure the representativeness of the sample, the units interviewed 
were selected following a stratification process based on industry, size and region. The survey was 
designed to collect information on production, technology, product quality, human resource policy, internal 
organization, relationships with suppliers and customers, and included a series of questions on general 
information about the plant. It was conducted during 2007 by CIES S.L., an experienced opinion and 
marketing research firm. In style, the survey is very similar to the one used in Osterman (1994), which 
analyses different aspects of internal labour markets and work organization in US firms. 
The personal interviews were in all cases with company managers (general manager, production manager 
or human resources manager) to guarantee the respondent had the required knowledge about the topics 
covered in the questionnaire. This procedure, known as  the “key informant approach” has been used in 
other EO studies, such as Kraus et al. (2012). In many plants, several managers were interviewed in order 
to ensure adequate responses to the specific sections of the survey. In this way, concerns for common 
method bias are minimized. The questionnaires were completed in approximately 45-minute personal 
interviews. All of the interviewers had previously received specific information regarding business issues. 
In many cases, more than one visit was required in order to complete the questionnaire.  
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The result is a unique dataset that provides an exhaustive picture of the internal dimensions of Spanish 
firms. The survey contains information from 322 medium-sized establishments (between 50 and 199 
employees) that employ 31,384 employees, and 79 large-sized establishments (more than 200 employees 
in each plant) representing 49,453 employees. 
 
2.3.2 Variable measurement 
 Dependent Variable 
Entrepreneurial Orientation. EO represents policies and practices providing the basis for entrepreneurial 
decisions and actions. It has been conceptualized and measured both as a unidimensional and a 
multidimensional construct (Covin and Wales, 2012). As noted by Wales and colleagues (2013: 375), “the 
choice between unidimensional versus multidimensional conceptualizations should be driven by the 
research question being investigated.” Our focus is on differences in EO between family and non-family 
firms. That is, we are interested in overall EO rather than in specific dimensions. As such, we view EO as a 
unidimensional (e.g. Khandwalla, 1977; Miller, 1983) organizational-level construct (Rigtering et al., 2014). 
We espouse the reasoning of Basso et al (2009), who argue that, while the unidimensional view of EO 
focuses on agents at the top of the organization, the multidimensional view broadens the focus to potential 
“key players” at lower levels, such as middle management. This more traditional unidimensional view is 
more in keeping with our focus, which is on the controlling families .  
Consistent with this classic unidimensional view of the EO construct, we measure EO using ten items 
originally developed by Covin and Slevin (1989) and later adapted by Zahra et al. (2004) to measure 
entrepreneurial orientation. This measurement scale has been successfully used in a number of empirical 
studies (Covin et al., 2006; Green et al., 2008; Escribá-Esteve et al., 2008) some in the family firm context 
(e.g. Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2006; Naldi et al., 2007; Cruz and Nordqvist, 2010). Following previous 
research, and consistent with the original conceptualization of the EO construct (Basso et al., 2009; Covin 
and Wales, 2012,; Wales et al., 2013), EO is treated as a single construct based on the aggregated 
responses to ten questions covering topics such as tolerance for high-risk projects, the pursuit of long-term 
goals and strategies, etc. The complete list of items is provided in Appendix 1. A 5-point Likert scale was 
used (1=totally disagree, 5= totally agree). Cronbach’s alpha for this construct is 0.74. 
 
Independent Variables 
Family firm. The literature on family firms is somewhat disperse and it is difficult to find a precise 
consensus definition of the term. However, the typical family firm has been characterized as an 
organization controlled, and usually managed, by multiple family members (Shanker and Astrachan, 1996; 
Lansberg, 1999), often  spanning several generations (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Gómez-Mejía et al., 
2007). McConaughy et al. (1998), for example, consider a family firm any company run by a founder or 
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member of the founding family. Similarly, Anderson and Reeb (2003), Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003), 
Faccio and Lang (2002), La Porta et al. (1999), Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999), Barth et al. (2005) 
consider a family firm as any business in which a founding family or founding individual owns a fraction of 
the company or serves on the board of directors. In these categorizations, the cut-off points for ownership 
percentage vary, often depending on whether the firm is publicly owned or not. Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
examine a wide variety of definitions, encompassing different levels and generations of individual- or 
family-ownership and/ or management. Other studies consider involvement by multiple members of the 
same family over time, counting as family firms only those in which several family members are acting as 
owners or managers of the business.  In our study, the term  is defined as any firm where the family 
directly or indirectly controls more than 50 percent of the shares if the company is privately held, or more 
than 10 percent of the shares if the company is publicly traded. 54.59 percent of the firms in our sample 
meet this definition. 
Technological intensity is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when the firm belongs to an industry 
considered by the Spanish bureau of statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística) as a medium-high or 
high-tech industry, and 0, otherwise. The criteria used by the Spanish bureau of statistics to determine the 
technological intensity of a given industry, as well as the resulting classification, are fully consistent with 
international standards. Industries rated as medium-high or high in terms of technological intensity are: 
pharmaceuticals; computers, electronic and optical products; air spacecraft; chemicals; weapons and 
ammunition; electrical equipment; machinery; motor vehicles; transport equipment excluding ships, boats, 
excluding air and spacecraft; medical and dental instruments. The value of the technological intensity 
variable for the firms that belong to the medium-low and low-technology industries is zero. 28.7% of the 
firms in the sample belong to technologically intense industries while the remaining 71.3% do not. 
Economic difficulties. Whether the firm is facing economic difficulties or not is captured through a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 if, during the three years prior to the survey, the firm made use of early 
retirements or fixed contract termination to adjust the size of the workforce, or if production or investment 
has fallen greatly or to some degree over the last three years. As proposed and supported by the 
evidence, the first two actions are viewed as decisions firms take in the face of a performance downturn 
(Ahmandjian and Robinson, 2001; Greenhalgh et al., 1988; Requejo, 1996). For example, Davidson et al. 
(1996) found that early retirement programs are likely to be preceded by deteriorating financial conditions. 
The second two variables are directly linked to firm performance. Production or investment below the 
levels of the past three years is a signal of declining performance and consequently economic difficulties. A 
three year decline in production figures is the direct result of a decline in the demand of the products 
produced by the plant. If production declines, sales figures also decline and that has an immediate 
negative impact on profits. Consequently, a decline in production would signal economic difficulties. 
Besides, a reduction in investments will decrease future profits (Baumol and Wolff 1983; Grazzi et al., 
2013; Pakes and Griliches, 1984, Weill, 1992) but also the economic difficulties faced by the company may 
have a negative impact on investments (Heshmati and Lööf, 2008) since in a context of reduced 
performance and profits, the resources available for investment decrease. Hence, when a plant observes 
that investment has decreased it may be a clear signal that the firm is facing economic difficulties. Finally, 
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it has to be noted that in previous research, a three-years observation period is considered sufficient to 
capture declining firm performance (Bruton et al., 2003; Morrow et al., 2004). 
Firm size. Firm size may also influence corporate entrepreneurship. For example, larger firms 
might have more organizational slack and thereby more resources to invest in entrepreneurial activities 
(Rauch et al., 2009; Galve y Salas, 1996). The questionnaire asked the respondents to indicate their firm’s 
size category (1= 50-199; 0= more than 199 workers) . EUROSTAT standards determine firm size  based 
on the number of employees.  
Age. A common control variable in family firm research is firm age, due to its ability to capture differences 
in behavior and performance due to culture and generation issues. Older plants are more likely to be run 
by the founder’s heirs, while young plants will be more likely to be managed by the founders. Firm age was 
computed as the number of years that had elapsed be the foundation of the plant or facility and 2007, the 
year the survey was administered. 
Given that the firm’s decision to engage in EO may be influenced by the competitive environment (Miller 
and Friesen, 1983; Zahra, 1996), we include a final control variable labeled intensity of competition, a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the facility is considered to be operating under very intense 
competition and 0 otherwise. 36 percent of the firms in the sample consider their competition to be very 
intense. 
2.3.3 Methodological approach 
First, we perform an OLS regression analysis to compare the entrepreneurial orientation of family 
versus non-family firms (hypothesis 1). The testing of Hypotheses 2 and 3 require the introduction of 
interaction terms, where the family firm dummy is interacted with technological intensity and economic 
difficulties. Continuous variables are centered in order to avoid multicollinearity. Robust standard errors are 
used in all our multivariate estimations. 
2.4 Results 
The means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations are shown in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1: Means, standard deviations, and zero-order Correlations 
 Mean Std. 
Dev. 
EO 1 2 3 4 5 6 
EO 3.26 0.4961 
1 
      
1. Family firm 0.55 0.4985 -0.1358** 1      
2. Size 0.47 0.4998 -0.1828 *** 0.0616 1     
3. Competitive 
intensity 
0.36 0.4803 0.0568 0.0099 -0.0715 1    
4. Age 42.47 30.361 0.0379 0.0332 -0.0744 0.0076 1   
5. Technological 
intensity 




-0.0071 -0.0597 -0.0967* 0.1208* 0.0695 0.0019 
1 
    +: p<0.1; *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001 
54.59 percent of the sample firms are family firms and the remaining 45.41 percent are non-family. The 
mean value of entrepreneurial orientation is 3.26 (on a scale of 1 to 5) while that of the generation proxy is 
42.47 years. As can be seen in from Table 2, the relationship between EO and the family firm dummy is 
negative and significant. Thus, in line with our first hypothesis, family firms are less entrepreneurially 
oriented than non-family firms. Also, the relationship between firm size and EO is negative and significant, 
suggesting that smaller firms are, on average, less entrepreneurially oriented. Without stating a formal 
hypothesis, we were interested in exploring variations in entrepreneurial orientation levels between family 
Vs non-family firms across firm size categories. Our findings indicated greater differences in EO between 
family and non-family firms in the medium size category. The average EO score is 3.245 for non-family 
firms and 3.107 for family firms. Even in the large size category, however, non-family firms are the more 
entrepreneurially oriented (3.402 versus 3.287).  
To assess the statistical significance of these differences, we ran a two-factor ANOVA. The results showed 
that, while the mean differences mentioned above are statistically significant, the interaction term is not, 
which suggests that differences in EO between family and non-family firms do not vary with firm size . 
Figure 1 depicts the EO levels of  family and non-family firms in the large and medium firm-size categories. 
It shows that non-family firms have higher EO levels. The two lines are almost parallel, indicating that 





























Table 2.2 shows the results of the OLS regression estimated to test Hypothesis 1. As can be seen, the 
effect is negative and significant in all four models summarized in the table, thus providing support for 
Hypothesis 1.Firm size is also significant, in that medium-sized firms are less entrepreneurially oriented 
than larger firms, in line with findings by previous studies of the role of firm size in EO (Rauch et al., 2009). 




2) EO (Model 3) EO (Model 4) 
Main effects 
Family firm (H1) 




-0.2274 *** -0.2187 ** -0.2276 *** 
Competitive intensity 
0.0621 0.0609 0.0624 0.0615 
Age 
0.0005 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 
Technological intensity 
0.0946 + -0.0078 0.0944 + -0.0081 
Economic difficulties 
-0.0367 -0.0415 -0.0403 -0.0469 
Interaction effects 
Family firm x Technological 
intensity (H2) 0.2112 + 
0.2114 + 
Family firm x Economic 
difficulties (H3) 0.0064 
0.0096 









R-squared 0.0634 0.0724 0.0634 0.0724 
Root MSE 0.48414 0.48245 0.4848 0.4831 
Significance levels are based on a two-tailed test, +: p<0.1; *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001 
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Table 2.2 also includes the interactions for testing Hypotheses 2 and 3 (Models 2, 3 and 4). Variance 
inflation factors indicate that our estimations are free of any multicollinearity problems. With hypothesis 2, 
we seek to explore how entrepreneurial orientation varies between family Vs non-family status and with the 
technological intensity of the sector . A look at the mean EO scores for family and non-family firms as a 
function of technological intensity shows that differences between family and non-family firms in EO are 
greater in sectors that rate low in technological intensity (3.333 versus 3.162). even in technology-intense 
sectors, however, non-family firms are the more entrepreneurially oriented (3.333 versus 3.312), although, 
in this case, the differences are non-significant. These relationships are reflected in Figure 1. 
The interaction of family and technological intensity is positive and significant, indicating  that, as advanced 
in Hypothesis 2, the EO of family firms is greater in more technology-intense industries. The interaction of 
family firm with economic difficulties, on the other hand, is non-significant. Thus, we fail to find support for 
Hypothesis 3.3 
 
2.4.1 Robustness checks 
Family firm definition  
Consistent with the vast majority of prior research, our definition of family firm takes ownership into 
account. However, in addition to ownership, family control of the firm may also manifest in family members 
holding key management positions. We first tested to see whether the results vary with the use of a more 
restrictive definition of family firm, which, besides ownership, considers the management dimension. This 
new variable took value of 1 if, in addition to the minimum ownership requirement, there were family 
members on the firm management team and/or board of directors. This was predominantly the case , 
suggesting that family ownership is closely linked to family management, and therefore a single variable (in 
this case ownership) correctly identifies the family firms in our sample. As can be seen in the results of the 
first model, summarized in Table 2.3, the results do not differ from those of the previous analyses, and thus 






                                                 
3 To rule out potential problems with common method bias, we ran the Harman’s single factor test. The shared variance among self-
reported measures is 0.23, which is far from the 0.50 threshold. In addition, as can be seen from Table 2, self-reported measures do 
not exhibit high correlations. Hence, we can consider our results and conclusions free of common method bias. 
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Table 2.3: Results with an alternative definition of family firm and endogeneity of family firm for 
Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3  
 
EO (alternative family) 
           OLS 
EO (endogeneity) 
       Treat. Reg. 
EO (endogeneity) 
      Treat. Reg. 
EO Equation       
Size -0.1887 
* 
-0.1579 * -0.1676 ** 
Competitive intensity 0.0652 
 
0.0598  0.0609  
Age 0.0003 
 
0.0008  0.0010  
Technological intensity -0.0993 
 
0.0548  -0.0549  
Economic difficulties -0.0253 
 
-0.0538  -0.0807 * 
Family firm -0.1895 
** 
-0.4684 ** -0.5600 *** 
Family firm x Technological intensity 
0.3058 
*   0.2224 ** 
Family firm x Economic difficulties 
-0.0335 
   0.0359  
Selection equation       
Size   0.2383  0.2367  
Competitive intensity   0.0301  0.0297  
Age   0.0032  0.0032  
Technological intensity   -0.2632 + -0.2612 + 
Economic difficulties   -0.0767  -0.0777  
Unions   0.0303  0.0313  
Outside   0.7078 *** 0.7088 *** 
Number of obs= 311  372  372  
F 3.29 **     
Wald chi2(5)   26.31 *** 32.85 *** 
Log pseudolikelihood   -493.46871  -491.44132  
Significance levels are based on a two-tailed test, +: p<0.1; *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001 
2.4.2 Endogeneity 
The literature comparing family and non-family firms suggests that family control of the firm may be an 
endogenous variable. Failure to control for the potentially endogenous character of the family-firm dummy 
may lead to biased results. Following Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Gómez-Mejía et al (2010), we 
address the endogeneity concern by estimating a maximum likelihood treatment effect model. The 
treatment effect model considers the impact of an endogenously-chosen binary treatment on another 
endogenous continuous variable, conditional on two sets of independent variables. In order to meet the 
exclusion restriction necessary for identification (Wooldridge, 2002), two variables not included in the OLS 
regression are added to the selection equation in the treatment model. These variables are the influence of 
unions on workers and whether the firm has production plants in foreign countries (outside Spain). The 
second of these variables was correlated with family firm status and uncorrelated with the residuals of the 
EO equation; in other words, it acts as an instrument for family firm status. 
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Table 2.4 summarizes the results of the treatment effect model. As can be seen, the influence of family 
control on EO is consistent with the previous OLS models, thus providing further support for Hypothesis 1. 
This alternative estimation procedure also offers support for Hypothesis 2. Hence, our findings and 
conclusions remain unchanged. 
2.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Examining the data through a SEW lens, this paper explores differences in EO between family and 
non-family firms. As hypothesized, family firms are found to be less entrepreneurially oriented than non-
family firms due to the pervasive influence of SEW protection motives in their decision making. We argue 
that the SEW framework is an appropriate conceptual lens through which to increase understanding of  the 
EO phenomenon in family firms and we are confident that the formal introduction of the SEW perspective 
to the analysis of the entrepreneurial behavior of family firms can help to clarify the current conflicting 
results regarding the connection between family control of firms and the promotion of entrepreneurial 
activities. 
While the results of this study are promising, more research is needed to fully incorporate the SEW 
perspective in the EO field. We therefore encourage future studies aimed at further clarification of the role 
of SEW and the disentanglement of SEW protection motives from other intervening factors. One factor that 
may help to explain differences in EO levels across firms is managerial capabilities and talent. More 
specifically, the often claimed reluctance of family firms to tap the external managerial talent pool (e.g. 
Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2003), sometimes motivated by SEW protection aims, may 
be an added deterrent to the implementation of EO practices by family firms. Furthermore, family-specific 
factors such as family functionality (Gudmunson and Danes, 2013) may also play a role. Family 
functionality or satisfaction with family relationships may have a significant influence on the feelings and 
behavior of family members, either facilitating or impeding the implementation of several types of strategic 
decisions, such as those pertaining to EO. The way in which family functionality interacts with SEW to 
determine strategic decision making and, particularly, firm-level entrepreneurship constitutes an interesting 
area of inquiry.  
Extensions should also consider the decisive role of moderating factors (Rauch et al., 2009). We have 
taken some initial steps in this direction by examining the moderating role of the technology intensity of the 
sector and firms’ economic difficulties. Consistent with our hypothesis, family firms in more technology-
intense industries exhibit similar EO levels to those of non-family firms. In less technology-intense 
industries, however, family firms  are significantly less entrepreneurially oriented than non-family firms, the 
reason being that, in technology-intense environments, failure to invest in entrepreneurship is riskier than 
actually making the investment. So, for firms competing in technologically-demanding industries, 
investment in entrepreneurship is the price they have to pay to remain competitive. Indeed, family firms in 
this setting are more willing to sacrifice a portion of their SEW in order to keep their economic returns to a 
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certain (aspirational) level.  In less technology-intense sectors, however, where investment in EO is less 
crucial for firm survival, and  the preservation of SEW therefore weighs more heavily.  
 Our analyses did not provide support for the moderating effect of the economic difficulties variable. 
We expected the reference point for family firms to shift from SEW protection to economic considerations 
in the face of economic difficulties. The fact that we continue to find a lower degree of EO, irrespective of 
such problems signals that SEW protection is an enduring characteristic of family firms and significantly 
drives their decisions. These findings are of great relevance for family firm research. Extant research has, 
in line with our finding of lower EO in family firms, documented SEW protection as a major driver in the 
decision-making process of family firms. However, economic goals  may sometimes conflict with the desire 
to protect SEW. Our study may provide evidence to help discern how family firms balance these two goals 
(i.e. economic and non-economic) under different circumstances. Our data suggest that, in technology-
intense industries, the pressure to remain competitive propels family firms towards greater investment in 
EO activities as opposed to greater SEW protection. However, when performance declines, and firm 
survival may be in jeopardy, thus threatening SEW, the preference for EO fades. Prior corporate-strategy 
research suggests that, when faced with a performance downturn, firms may be best advised to focus  
scarce resources on core activities with more certain returns (Starbuck and Hedberg, 1977) and postpone 
any new strategic initiatives (D’Aveni, 1989). March and Shapira (1987, 1992) indicated that, in the event 
of declining performance, firms shift their attention from aspirations to survival, prioritize risk over potential 
returns and resort to more conservative strategies. While EO may render positive results, it also involves 
potential costs that may act as a deterrent to family businesses  facing difficult times. Hence, in 
circumstances when survival is at stake, family firms do not necessarily shift their concerns from SEW to 
economic issues, but may persist in protecting their SEW by opting for actions that preserve the family’s 
control and by sticking to known paths rather than attempting new activities that could be more efficient in 
the long run but also more costly. Our results would suggest that economic reference points are more 
salient when the threat to firm survival in the long term has to do with environmental characteristics (i.e. the 
technological intensity of the sector) and less relevant when the threat stems from the firm itself (i.e. 
economic difficulties). Clearly, however, there is a need for more research on how economic and non-
economic goals are balanced in situations of performance decline, when firm, and by extension, family 
survival may be at stake.  
Implications for managers 
 Our study offers several suggestions for family-firm managers. From a purely economic standpoint, 
it appears that family firms can benefit by increasing investment in EO (Rauch et al., 2009), this is 
particularly true in the case of firms operating  in technology-intense sectors, where EO is fundamental to 
survival. Since increasing emphasis on EO may place SEW in jeopardy, families should seek a balance 
between maximizing economic performance and preserving their identity (i.e. SEW). Since under-investing 
in EO can lead to opportunity loss and lack of competitiveness, the challenge for controlling families is to 
increase EO while preserving SEW. It is important to note that SEW can be maintained, or even enhanced, 
through direct and complete ownership of the company (i.e. 100% ownership). It is not the only way to 
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preserve the family’s SEW, however. Actions that enhance the company’s image and legitimacy,  reinforce 
family identity, or guarantee the family dynasty may also serve SEW-protection objectives when economic 
circumstances recommend them to cede a portion of their ownership.  
Limitations and Future Research 
Like most research, this paper has its limitations. Firstly, the data were collected in 2007, before 
the current economic crisis unraveled. More recent data might yield a different picture. In future research, it 
would be interesting to see whether the use of a broader economic database produces different findings. 
While increased pressure to remain competitive in the current economic situation may push some family 
firms to become more entrepreneurially oriented, others  may become more risk-averse in order to save 
existing resources and ensure survival.  
The second limitation of this study relates to the cross-sectional nature of our data. Cross-sectional 
studies can suggest correlations but do not allow researchers to infer causal relationships or effects over 
time. Thirdly, our sample consists entirely of Spanish firms, thus, any inference to other countries must be 
made with caution. Country-specific cultural and traditional influences may reduce the generalizability of 
our findings. It would be interesting in this respect to investigate the potential moderating role of country-
specific cultural characteristics on the relationship between family control of businesses and EO. While the 
role of firm culture in the EO activity of family firms has been documented (Zahra et al., 2004), that of 
country culture remains unexplored to date. 
Additionally, an increasing number of scholars have argued that family firms do not constitute a 
homogeneous population (Salvato, 2002; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011) but in fact differ on a range of 
dimensions (Klein et al., 2005). Thus, different types of family firms may present different EO patterns 
(Cruz and Nordqvist, 2010; Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2006). While we lack the necessary information to 
enable further differentiation between different types of family firms, we make a call for research into 
differences in EO levels among family firms. 
It should be noted, moreover, that, while our research design considers EO an unidimensional construct 
(Covin and Wales, 2012), it could also be conceptualized as a multidimensional construct (Wales et al., 
2013). We believe that future research should also explore potential differences between family and non-
family firms across the different dimensions in which EO has an impact. Although different in nature (Covin 
and Wales, 2012), the unidimensional and multidimensional approaches could be used to complement 
each other and enable a better understanding of the determinants and consequences of EO. 
In conclusion, family firms tend to engage less in EO activities than non-family firms. However, the need to 
be innovative in high-tech sectors appears to be strong enough to overcome family firms’ reluctance to 
engage wholeheartedly in EO activities. Family firms’ inclination towards SEW protection may therefore 
have negative economic consequences, since EO appears to enhance firm performance. 
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2.7: Appendix: EO and Operational Performance items 
Entrepreneurial orientation variable 
Indicate their level of agreement with the following statements about the management style (from 1: 
strongly disagree to 5: Total agreement). 
1. Shows a great deal of tolerance for high-risk projects 
 
2. Uses only “tried and true” procedures, systems, and methods (R)  
 
3. Challenges, rather than responds to, its major competitors 
 
4. Takes bold, wide-ranging strategic actions, rather than minor changes in tactics 
 
5. Emphasizes the pursuit of long-term goals and strategies 
 
6. Rewards taking calculated risks 
 
7. Is very aggressive and seeks to appropriate the business from its competitors 
 
8. Rewards good ideas and tolerates unsuccessful ones 
 
9. Favors the creation of autonomous units to encourage creative thinking 
 
10. Encourages new ideas and initiatives 










CHAPTER III: ARE FAMILY FIRMS REALLY MORE SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE? 
3.1 Introduction 
During the last few decades, family business literature has extensively studied how family firms 
make strategic choices that are consistently different from those made by non-family firms [see Gomez 
Mejia, Cruz, Berrone & De Castro (2011) for a recent review]. Among the many issues addressed by family 
scholars, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has received increasing attention. However, despite the 
efforts to disentangle the role of the family dimension in the adoption of social initiatives (i.e., actions that 
appear to further the social good, beyond the interest of the firm (McWilliams &Siegel, 2001: 117), there is 
a lack of agreement about whether family firms are more or less socially responsible. 
While some scholars have argued that family firms are more prone to proactively engaging in 
social activities because, by doing so, they preserve and enhance their non-financial preferences and 
socioemotional wealth (SEW) (Cennamo, Berrone, Cruz & Gomez Mejia, 2012), others have advocated 
that family firms may not be more socially responsible. Amoral familism (Banfield, 1958), distrust of 
outsiders (Fukuyama, 1995), and the “dark side” of SEW (Kellermanns, Eddleston & Zellweger, 2012) 
make family members more concerned with their own interests than those of others, thus negatively 
affecting social actions (Morck & Yeung, 2004). Evidence also seems to be mixed and contradictory. For 
instance, Berrone, Cruz, Gómez-Mejía & Larraza-Kintana (2010) showed that controlling families adopt 
environment-friendly strategies more frequently than non-family firms in polluting industries. Dyer & 
Whetten (2006) found no significant differences between family and non-family firms, with regard to 
positive social initiatives, but discovered that family firms were more concerned with avoiding social 
concerns. Interestingly, Bingham, Dyer, Smith & Adams (2011) show exactly the opposite.   
There are various possible reasons behind these contradictory views and evidence. Firstly, though 
with some exceptions (i.e., Bingham et al., 2011), most research dealing with the link between family firms 
and CSR has focused almost exclusively on a single dimension of companies’ social actions, namely the 
environment, whilst when several dimensions have been considered, they have been treated in a 
preliminary way (Dyer & Whetten, 2006). Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, these works also 
focused on a single dimension of family SEW, namely the family’s concern with its image and reputation. 
This provides an incomplete picture of the uniqueness of family firms (Berrone, Cruz & Gomez Mejia, 
2012). Lastly, previous studies have largely neglected the role of contextual factors that amplify or mute 
the relationship between firm type and social actions.  
We address the above gaps in the literature by arguing that because family firms are concerned 
with their image and reputation as a way to protecting their SEW, they are likely to be more responsive to 
external stakeholders’ demands (more specifically, the environment, the community, and their customers) 
than non-family firms. However, their concern with control and influence within the company and their 
strong emotional attachment to it (another two key SEW dimensions) are likely to deter social actions 
related to internal stakeholders (namely, employees and governance). Moreover, we explore how 
institutional and organizational conditions affect the link between family ownership and CSR. Specifically, 
we argue that national differences in economic, cultural and social terms, industry, and declining 
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organizational performance, have a different impact on the degree of CSR in family and non-family firms. 
We tested our theoretical tenets on family and non-family controlled companies in 22 European countries 
during a period of 4 years, using a unique and original collection of data.  
 This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, we reconcile the seemingly 
contradictory views about the role of family firms in terms of CSR. We argue and show that family firms can 
be socially responsible (vis-à-vis external stakeholders) and socially irresponsible (vis-à-vis internal 
stakeholders) at the same time, suggesting that family firms can simultaneously “be good and bad”. In 
doing so, we expand stakeholder theory by providing fine-grained arguments and more evidence about the 
role of diverse principals in enacting varying responses to stakeholder pressures. Our analysis of the 
moderating factors between ownership and CSR also contributes in this direction. Unlike prior works, we 
take into account organizational and institutional moderators in the relationship between family firms and 
CSR outcomes. We argue and show that in responding to stakeholder claims, family owners act differently, 
not only depending on the type of stakeholders (internal versus external), but also depending on whether 
pressures to implement social practices come from institutional or organizational factors. Finally, studying 
firms from different countries enables national differences to be taken into account, an issue which has 
been neglected in almost all family studies up until now (Dyer & Whetten, 2006). 
3.2 Theory and hypotheses development 
 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is considered as an overarching construct that 
encompasses the set of business policies and practices reflecting corporate responsibility for some of the 
wider societal good (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). Yet, the precise manifestation and direction of these 
social practices are left to the discretion of the corporation, largely affected by who owns the company, and 
dependent on the varying owners’ preferences (Berrone, et al., 2010; Walls, Berrone & Phan, 2012). 
Concerns over legitimacy influence firms by pushing them to adopt certain managerial practices that are 
expected to be socially valued by stakeholders (Deephouse, 1999). However, given the conflicting voices 
amongst different stakeholders, it is not clear how firms give priority to the diverse social claims made by 
these stakeholder groups based on their degree of salience and importance (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997). 
 The confusion is highly visible in the case of family firms. The stakeholder view considers the 
family as an internal stakeholder because it is linked to the company through ownership, employment, or 
family ties (Mitchell, Agle, Chrisman & Spence, 2011). Initial studies ignored family interaction with external 
stakeholders assuming that family owners were shielded from outside pressures because of their strong 
ownership position. New research has challenged this view, finding that family firms are also responsive to 
the claims of external stakeholders (Berrone, et al., 2010; Bingham et al 2011). However, understanding 
how families give priority to internal and external stakeholder claims is an unresolved issue (Mitchell et al., 
2011).  
 To fill this void, we propose a combined framework drawing on organizational identity theory, the 
socio-emotional wealth approach and stakeholder theory. Organizational identity refers to elements that 
are central, unique and enduring about an organization (Scott & Lane, 2000). When applied to the reasons 
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why social practices are adopted, organizational identity predicts that firms are more likely to engage in 
social actions if, in doing so, these reinforce their self-professed desires. By helping the firm to define what 
it needs to look at, organizational identity also explains how firms prioritize different stakeholder claims 
(Brickson, 2007).  
 Scholars agree that the preservation of the non-financial aspects or “affective endowments” of 
family owners, what Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) refer to as “socioemotional wealth” (SEW), is the most 
salient aspect of family firm identity. Proponents of the SEW view suggest that family owners are more 
likely to engage in social practices even when there is no clear evidence that this engagement implies 
economic rewards, because there is socioemotional reward for the family (Berrone et al., 2012).  
 Implicit in this claim is the assumption that SEW is a monolithic concept, a unique reference point 
that guides family owners’ strategic decisions. Moreover, it is also assumed that responses will be 
homogeneous regardless of the type of stakeholders, their proximity or the form of legitimacy they grant. 
We challenge these assumptions by drawing on recent studies that suggest that SEW has different 
dimensions, which can explain the existence of different reference points among family principals (Berrone, 
et al., 2012; Cennamo, et al., 2012), associated with positive or negative valence (Kellermanns, et al., 
2012). We argue that, when deciding about social actions, family owners are concerned with protecting 
their SEW. Still, given the multidimensional nature of SEW, and the existence of multiple claims from 
diverse stakeholders, response to this concern may elicit varied answers from family owners. As argued 
below, this implies that family firms can “be good and bad” at the same time, in terms of social practices. 
 
3.2.1 Family and non-family firms, and responses to internal and external stakeholders 
 Extant research suggests that, as family firms are concerned with corporate reputation, they should 
be particularly inclined to satisfy the demands of internal stakeholders (i.e. those that are directly related to 
the company through ownership or employment) by pursuing responsible work practices (Zellweger, 
Nason, Nordqvist, & Brush, 2011). However, with some exceptions (e.g., Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005), 
family business literature is full of examples that show exactly the opposite. Family ownership is often 
associated with the design of unfair compensation systems (Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009), use of 
lower peer appraisal processes (Fiegener, Brown, Prince, & File, 1994), managerial entrenchment 
(Gómez-Mejía, Nuñez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001), nepotism (Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003; López, 
Revuelta y Sánchez, 1998), scapegoating of non-family executives and employees (Gómez-Mejía, 
Larraza-Kintana & Makri, 2003), and gender discrimination (Jimenez, 2009). Implicitly, the bulk of evidence 
shows the existence of two distinct types of internal stakeholders (family vs. non-family) in family firms, 
who are treated differently when it comes to social practices.  
 The “emotional attachment” dimension of SEW can explain this differential treatment. Due to the 
type of social links family members have with their firms, family companies become the place where their 
needs for affection and belonging are satisfied (Berrone et al., 2012). This results in family altruism 
(Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003). Although family altruism is generally reputed to temper self-interest 
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inside the family business (Chrisman, Chua & Litz, 2004), it also has a negative side. Specifically, the 
presence of altruism fosters a set of interdependent relationships among family members that differentiates 
them from people outside the family (Chrisman, Chua & Bergiel, 2009). Thus, the presence of family 
altruism can cause inconsistencies in the application of organizational rules depending on whether the 
employee is a family or non-family member.  
Another important dimension of family SEW that also leads to asymmetric treatment of employees 
(family vs. non-family) lies in the family owners’ desire to keep full control over the organization. Some 
authors suggest that this is the most salient factor affecting family company behavior (Chrisman, Chua, 
Pearson & Barnett, 2012). The SEW approach predicts that, in order to preserve SEW, family owners need 
to control the firm on a permanent basis (Berrone, et al., 2012). Hence, they engage in strategies that 
empower them to retain and/or extend their power over the firm’s operations. Employing family members, 
even though they are not qualified (Chua et al., 2009), or decoupling family members’ compensation from 
performance outcomes (Cruz, Gómez-Mejía & Becerra, 2010) are examples of strategies directed at 
preserving the “family control and influence” dimension of SEW. This asymmetry is contrary to the 
existence of social practices toward employees that imply fair treatment of the workforce and equal 
opportunities for all of them. The “emotional attachment” and the “family control and influence” dimension 
of SEW also explain family owners’ responses to internal stakeholder claims related to governance. When 
a family owns a large portion of shares, family owners are likely to see governance structures as a tool to 
reinforce their control and to force top executives to pursue the family’s objectives (Kellermans et al., 
2012). In this case, instead of using corporate governance mechanisms to legitimize the firm, the family 
uses them to reinforce family control in the company and protect other family members (Jones, Makri & 
Gómez-Mejía, 2008), adopting mechanisms which go against good governance practices. Evidence 
supports this view. Family firms are known to have less independent directors (Anderson & Reeb, 2004), 
be more likely to have CEO duality  (Voordeckers, Van Gils & Van den Heuvel, 2007), and make fewer 
disclosures of their corporate governance practices in their proxy statements (Ali, Chen & Radhakrishnan, 
2007). 
Therefore, although literature points to the implementation of social practices related to internal 
stakeholders as essential to bringing legitimacy to firms (Mayo, Gómez-Mejía, Berrone, Firfiray, & Villena, 
2012), we argue that this “legitimacy-seeking logic” operates differently in the case of family businesses. If 
engaging in proactive stakeholder management with internal stakeholders jeopardizes family control and 
exposes family members to higher risks compared to non-family firms, family businesses will be more 
reluctant to implement social practices related to internal stakeholders. Formally stated, this leads us to 
posit the following statement:  
H1a: Family firms are less likely to adopt social practices related to internal stakeholders (i.e., employees 
and governance) than non-family firms. 
A different picture emerges when it comes to responding to external stakeholder demands. In this 
case, the family owners’ main concerns are to protect and enhance the family image and reputation, which 
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is another important dimension of SEW (Berrone et al., 2012). As opposed to internal stakeholders, 
external stakeholders are not seen as a direct threat to the family’s emotional attachment or influence over 
the company. Nevertheless, they can be powerful elements in affecting a company’s reputation and image 
(Berrone, Gelabert, Fosfuri & Gómez-Mejía, 2013).  
Family members are sensitive about the external image they project to external stakeholders 
(Craig & Dibrell, 2006). This is because the identity of the family owner is so closely tied to the organization 
that external stakeholders perceive the firm as an extension of the family itself. In many cases, the family 
even connects its name and reputation to the product it sells (Birghman et al., 2012). Consequently, family 
firms are expected to be more willing to endorse any social practice that improves their image and 
legitimacy in the outside world (Cennamo, et al., 2012). At the same time, the SEW approach argues that 
since family owners are not faceless owners, they are far more exposed to losses of SEW, as a result of 
socially irresponsible behavior, than anonymous investors (Berrone, et al., 2010). Thus, they avoid 
engaging in any actions that may lead external parties to stigmatize them as irresponsible corporate 
citizens (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013). Thus, we propose:  
Hypothesis 1b. Family firms are more likely to adopt social practices related to external stakeholders (i.e., 
the environment, and the community) than non-family firms. 
3.2.2 Institutional and organizational factors as moderators of the relationship between ownership 
and CSR 
By building on the multidimensional nature of SEW, the framework developed so far has argued 
that, when compared to non-family owners,  family owners respond differently to internal and external 
stakeholders, when it comes to social actions. In this section, we also contend that given the SEW 
preservation concern that characterizes family owners, the determinants of CSR decisions in terms of both 
internal and external stakeholders may differ in family and non-family firms4. Based on different disciplines 
that have supported the notion that “country matters” and that geographic and competitive environments 
have an enduring inﬂuence on organizations (Marquis & Battilana, 2009), we first examine the effect of 
national and industry references on both family and non-family firms, when they make CSR decisions. We 
also analyze the effect of declining firm performance” since this is a key variable in understanding 
decisions pertaining to CSR activities (Roberts, 1992), and it is shown to have an impact on family owners’ 
SEW preservation goals (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007).  
4 Given that the arguments presented in this section apply to both internal and external stakeholders, and 
for the sake of parsimony, we have not made a distinction between different types of stakeholders. 
Nonetheless, empirical analyses do reflect this difference. 
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3.2.2.1 Institutional factors: national CSR standards and industry conditions, and their effect on 
social activities 
 Strategic conformity refers to the extent to which a firm’s behavior adheres to central tendencies 
and industry norms, and emphasizes the isomorphic processes that underlie conforming behaviors 
(Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). When applied to CSR, research suggests that, when deciding on social 
initiatives, firms often adopt similar “best practices” to avoid experimentation (and the associated risks of 
it), and secure an appropriate response that will grant expected legitimacy (Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995). 
Indeed, some would argue that external forces have transformed CSR “from heresy to dogma” for modern 
corporations (Lim & Tsutsui, 2012). Literature also shows that the reference that firms use to benchmark 
their practices is influenced by national and cultural boundaries (Campbell, Eden & Miller, 2012), and by 
the characteristics of the industry in which the company operates  (Surroca, Tribo & Wadock, 2010). 
Therefore, firms are expected to follow national and industrial references when deciding on their CSR 
activities.  
 When it comes to social practices, one country that actively sets national standards for CSR, and is 
often used as a role model, is the United States (USA). Academic evidence points to the USA as a pioneer 
in incorporating CSR to the business agenda (Kolk, 2000). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that firms 
located in a country that is closer in economic, social, geographical, and cultural terms to the USA, are 
more likely to observe social practices and perceive greater pressures to engage in social activities than 
firms located in countries further away from the USA. This is particularly true for public-traded companies 
who are subject to the scrutiny of global stakeholders. Hence, the distance of a country with respect to the 
USA can be considered an indicator of national CSR practice standards.  
 Companies are also likely to conform to industry practices (Matten & Moon, 2008) in Europe, a 
community in which CSR initiatives are largely driven by industry associations, Indeed, a recent European 
study (Zollo et al., 2011) observed that the industry in which a firm operates is one of the key external 
factors that determines the degree of cognitive alignment between managers and stakeholders in terms of 
CSR activities. More specifically, they indicate that high technology industries are among the sectors with 
the highest alignment (narrowest gaps), which results in them being more willing to engage in social 
practices. In line with this argument, Surroca, Tribo & Wadock (2010) suggested that in high-growth 
industries, such as the high-tech sector, firms are more likely to engage in social practices because in 
doing so, they obtain greater reputational benefits than firms competing in more mature sectors. The 
reasoning is that in a high technology sector, a firm’s business and reputation tend to be built in one area, 
while in more mature industries, they are spread over several domains. As a result, firms in technological 
sectors benefit more from the implementation of social practices, in terms of achieving social legitimacy 
Additionally, these gains are crucial to accessing key resources for younger, and growing companies (Zott 
& Huy, 2007), a scenario which is common in high technology sectors.   
 Despite its contribution to understanding CSR, this “legitimacy-seeking” perspective 
overemphasizes the blanket role of institutional forces and neglects the role of principals in shaping firms’ 
response to institutional pressures in the form of conforming or non-conforming behavior. Based on a SEW 
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approach, we argue that pressure to conform to these two CSR catalysts, i.e. national CSR standards and 
industry conditions, is lower for family firms. Firstly, as the family is the dominant shareholder, family 
business managers have greater power to act unilaterally than their non-family business counterparts 
(Carney, 2005). Moreover, the use of an idiosyncratic reference point (SEW) to guide strategic decision-
making is likely to imply different logic in assessing the benefits and costs of implementing social practices 
and, above all, diverse and peculiar interests in driving the decision to respond to stakeholder claims. The 
combination of the two arguments, family owners’ discretion to behave idiosyncratically, and the pursuit of 
unique family goals, also suggests that family firms’ strategic responses are likely to be more 
heterogeneous than those of non-family firms (Chrisman & Patel, 2012). As a result, family firms’ behavior 
has greater variations in terms of social practices.  
 The above arguments suggest that non-family firms, which are driven by goals that are mainly 
financial in nature, offer similar responses to stakeholder claims, and are thus more likely to follow national 
and industry references as a way to gaining social legitimacy and securing key resources. Specifically, 
externally and internally oriented social practices increase when non-family firms are located in countries 
that are closer to the USA in economic, social, geographical, and cultural terms, and for non-family firm 
operating in high technology industries. The influence of national CSR standards and industry conditions is 
weaker for family firms. Powerful family owners tend to tailor their responses to stakeholder pressures in 
order to meet their SEW protection target instead of implementing off-the-shelf solutions, even when these 
solutions have been accepted as standard. Formally stated, we posit the following:  
Hypothesis 2a. Compared to non-family firms, the social practices of family firms are less likely to be 
influenced by national CSR standards (i.e., distance with respect to the USA) 
Hypothesis 2b: Compared to non-family firms, the social practices of family firms are less likely to be 
influenced by industry conditions (i.e., technological intensity of the sector) 
3.2.2.2 Organizational factors: Declining performance and social activities  
 Literature on CSR indicates that the financial return on social practices is, at least in the short term, 
questionable from an economic viewpoint (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). When firms experience a decline in 
performance that may even put firm survival at stake, it may be advisable for them to focus scarce 
resources on core activities with more certain returns (Starbuck & Hedberg, 1977). March & Shapira (1992) 
argued that under declining performance, firms tend to shift their attention from aspirations to survival, 
emphasizing the dangers rather than the gains, which, in turn, results in more conservative behavior. Thus, 
when performance diminishes, firms may respond by limiting their engagement in social practices.  
 We expect this tendency to reduce social activities as firm performance declines to be greater for 
family firms. One of the characteristics of owner families is the concentration of a large amount of their 
personal wealth in a single business (Faccio & Lang, 2002). This concentration allows them to control the 
firm, feeding SEW, but also links their financial and socio-emotional capital to the destiny of the business. 
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In the extreme, the family loses everything if the firm does not survive. As Chrisman & Patel (2012) states, 
“as performance weakens, family firms are expected to frame decisions more negatively than non-family 
firms …, owing to the prospect of both economic losses and losses of socioemotional wealth.” (p.980). 
Therefore, the decisions made by family firms are more sensitive to declining performance than non-family 
firms. 
We expect this greater sensitivity to business decline in family firms to be reflected in the CSR 
arena as well, leading family firms to limit their social activities more than their non-family counterparts. 
When performance declines, controlling families not only tend to pay more attention to survival (March & 
Shapira, 1992), but also use control as the key reference point to gauge SEW (Gómez-Mejía, et al., 2007). 
That is, families shift their attention from other potential SEW reference points, such as image or legitimacy 
to control, because the increasing threat to their firm’s survival is also a threat to the family’s undiversified 
wealth, and may put their capacity to manage the firm under question. Following the logic of the arguments 
presented in Hypothesis 1a, this emphasis on the control dimension of SEW will further deter families from 
investing in internally oriented CSR practices. In addition, as reflected in Hypothesis 1b, externally oriented 
CSR activities are expected to be fuelled by the family’s interest in protecting their image and legitimacy. If 
families turn their attention to control when performance declines, this will translate into fewer externally 
oriented CSR activities. Consequently, we expect that:  
Hypothesis 3. Compared to non-family firms, family firms are more likely to reduce social practices in the 
face of declining performance.  
3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 Data Collection and sample 
We used the universe of publicly-held companies in Europe whose market capitalization was over 
€50 million.5 To be included in our sample, a firm had had to be listed for the whole 2001-2010 period. This 
prevented any potential bias associated with recent entrants. Following previous studies, we excluded 
companies from the finance sector. This initial process resulted in 1,617 companies. This figure was 
reduced to 598 after matching companies with available data on social practices. 
We used several sources to collect data for our research, such as the CSRHub database, the 
world’s largest corporate social responsibility (CSR) database providing social, environmental, community, 
and governance ratings on around 7,000 companies from 135 industries in 91 countries. It is also the first 
database that combines data from five of the leading socially responsible investment (SRI) analysis firms 
(also known as Environment, Social, Governance-ESG), and over 120 influential NGOs. Thus, the data are 
relatively objective, and are not based solely on self-reported measures. Therefore, they are less likely to 
5 We had to inspect each company´s annual report on an individual basis to determine its family/non-family 
status. Thus, we decided to set €50M market capitalization as a cut-off point to limit the search to 
reasonable limits. Further analyses showed that about 10% of European companies have a market 
capitalization below €70 million. Thus, our cut-off point did not reduce the representativeness of the 
sample.  
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suffer from social desirability biases. While not as widely used in management as the KLD database, the 
CSRHub has recently been used in the context of social responsibility, both in academic (Bu, Wagner, & 
Yu, 2013) and practitioner environments (Gidawani, 2013). Lastly, like KLD, it includes employee and 
governance performance indicators, so its categorization of social practices fits with the distinction we have 
made between internal and external socially oriented practices.6  
We used the “ultimate owner” criteria from the ORBIS (Bureau Van Dyck) database to identify 
companies in which there was an owner or group of owners who held at least 20% of the shares. Then, we 
manually inspected the annual and governance reports of each company to obtain the percentage of family 
ownership in any of the sampled years and the influence of the family in the management and governance 
of the company. Based on previous studies (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2003), we classified the company as a 
family firm if two criteria were met: a) an individual or a family group owned at least 20% of the shares 
during the whole period 2001-2010. In line with Villalonga & Amit (2006), we took members with the 
highest percentage of shares as the focal family and b) at least one member of the family was on the board 
of directors. Following this process, we ended up with 107 family firms and 491 non-family firms. Thus, our 
final panel consisted of 598 European listed firms, 18% of which were classed as family firms. Accounting 
and market data were drawn from the BLOOMBERG database, whilst the remaining data on the 
characteristics of the firm (country, industry, and age) were taken from the ORBIS database. Data to 
construct the CAGE Index were generously provided by Pankaj Ghemawat (www.ghemawat.com).  
We collected data on CSR from 2008 (the first year in which CSRHub data were available) to 2012 
(last year available). In order to guarantee time causality, ownership and financial information for a given 
year was matched with the average CSRHub rates of the two subsequent years. For example, financial 
and ownership information for 2007 was matched with the average CSRHub rates for 2008 and 2009. We 
ended up with four blocks of matched data that constituted an unbalanced four-year panel. 
3.3.2 Variables mesurement 
Dependent Variable: Social Practices 
CSRHub is an independent organization (www.csrhub.org) that provides information on social 
practices in over 7,000 companies from 135 industries in 91 countries. The CSRHub methodology maps 
each element of data it receives from a data source into one or more subcategories and converts it a to a 
numeric scale from 0 to 100 (100 = positive rating). Subsequently, it compares the scores from different 
data sources for the same company and adjust all the scores from a source to remove bias and create a 
more consistent rating. It finally aggregates these ratings to category level. Five main categories became 
apparent, two related to internal stakeholders (employees and governance), and three related to external 
stakeholders (the environment, the community and customers).  




The Governance category covers the disclosure of policies and procedures, board independence and 
diversity, executive compensation, attention to stakeholder concerns, and evaluation of a company’s 
culture of ethical leadership and compliance.  
The Employees category includes disclosure of policies, programs, and performance in diversity, labor 
relations and labor rights, compensation, benefits, including those that engage employees and improve 
worker development, and employee training, health and safety. The latter covers workplace policies and 
programs that boost employee morale, workplace productivity, company policies and practices to engage 
employees, and worker development. The evaluation focuses on the quality of policies and programs, 
compliance with national laws and with internationally recognized worker rights, as well as proactive 
management initiatives. 
External stakeholders 
Environment category data covers a company’s interactions with the environment at large, including 
use of natural resources, and company impact on the Earth’s ecosystems. The category evaluates 
corporate environmental performance, compliance with environmental regulations and many other 
environmental initiatives, such as the mitigation of a company's environmental footprint, leadership in 
addressing climate change through appropriate policies and strategies, energy-efficient operations, and the 
development of renewable energy, and other alternative environmental technologies.  
The Community category covers the company’s commitment and effectiveness within the local, 
national and global community in which it does business. It reflects a company’s citizenship, its charitable-
giving programs, and volunteerism.  
The Customers category covers the responsibility of a company for the development, design, and 
management of its products and services, and their impacts on customers and society at large. This 
reflects a company’s capacity to reduce environmental costs, create new market opportunities through new 
sustainable technologies or processes, and produce or market goods and services that enhance the health 
and quality of life for consumers. It also relates to product safety, quality, and the company’s response to 
problems with safety and quality. 
Independent Variables 
In order to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we included a dummy variable (family) that took the value of 1 
when the firm was controlled by a family and 0 if it wasn't. This coding was based on the methodology 
mentioned above, to identify firms under family control.  
To test Hypothesis 2a, we proxied national CSR standards in terms of the cultural, economic and 
social distance from the USA, a benchmark country in social activities. We labelled this variable “national 
standard distance”. The distance between countries is a valid instrument to approach the national 
standards for a given country, because distance measures provide metrics to gauge the similarity or 
differences between the cultural, economic and social characteristics of nations (e.g. Gómez-Mejía, et al., 
2010). Then, if a country is identified that may be deemed to have high standards for CSR activities, the 
distance from that country indicates how close the standards of the focus country are compared to those of 
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the benchmark country. In our case, we selected the USA as the reference country. As previously argued, 
the USA is often used as a role model for social practices. In addition to its visibility in the social standards 
arena, it is outside the sample universe (i.e., Europe).  
We followed previous studies that considered distance as a construct with multiple dimensions that 
captures different types of distances between countries (Campbell, et al., 2012). In our case, we used 
Ghemawat’s (2001) CAGE index, where CAGE represents Cultural, Administrative, Geographic and 
Economic distances. Compared to traditional cultural measures used in previous studies (Hofstede, 1980), 
the CAGE measurement suggests that countries can be ranked according to administrative, geographic 
and economic features, as well as cultural aspects. In our case, we considered the CAGE index between 
the European country the company belonged to and the USA, for each company in the final sample.  
Regarding the influence of industry (Hypothesis 2b), we relied on international standards to divide 
firms in two groups, according to the technological intensity of their industrial sector. We created a dummy 
variable (HT sector) that took a value of 1 when the company belonged to a high technology sector and 0 
when it did not. 
Lastly, declining performance (Hypothesis 3) was measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s 
ROA ratio at year t-1 to firm performance at year t. To avoid problems with the log transformation of 
negative returns, we added 1 to all original ROA values before calculating the logarithm. The declining 
performance variable took a negative value when firm performance at year t was above firm performance 
in the previous year, zero when it remained the same, and a positive value when the company’s ROA 
declined. Hence, this variable increases as firm performance declines.  
Control Variables 
We included several control variables to control for other potential determinants of company CSR. We 
first controlled for firm size, since larger firms are subject to closer scrutiny by the public from media, 
special interests, and stakeholders than their smaller counterparts (Rindova, Pollock & Hayward, 2006), 
thereby raising the likelihood of them acting in more socially responsible ways (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). 
Companies’ total assets were used to approach firm size. To correct for skewness in multivariate analyses, 
we included the logarithm transformation of these total assets. We also controlled for firm age, in terms of 
the number of years since the firm’s creation and used the logarithm transformation in a multivariate 
analysis. We considered two additional variables to capture the potential effect that market forces may 
have on a firm’s social behavior. The first one was Tobin’s Q, to account for a firm’s growth opportunities 
(Dyer & Whetten, 2006). We measured this as the market capitalization ratio plus the book value of debt, 
as a percentage of a firm’s total assets (Chung & Pruitt, 1994). The second measure was volatility, 
calculated as the standard deviation of the company’s stock returns. Finally, since high debt costs may 
limit the firm’s access to the resources needed to develop CSR activities, we included Cost of debt, 
measured as the financial interest expenses as a percentage of financial debt. 
3.3.3 Methodological approach 
We used random-effect panel data to estimate the influence of family control on CSR. According to 
the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test, a random-effect model is more suitable than a fixed-effect 
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model. Moreover, due to the time-invariant nature of the family firm dummy, a fixed-effect model cannot be 
estimated without dropping the family business variable (Dyer & Whetten, 2006). To test Hypotheses 1a 
and 1b, we considered the full sample of family and non-family firms, and looked at the estimation of the 
family dummy. For the rest of the hypotheses, we ran separate panel data models in the subsample of 
family and non-family firms. The split sample method is appropriate when theory predicts independent-
dependent variables relations by subgroups (family vs. non-family) and has been extensively used in 




The descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used in this study are reported in Table 3.1. 
Results show a high correlation between the five different dimensions of CSR and negative correlations 
between the five dimensions of CSR and the family firm dummy. It also shows that although all four 
correlations are negative, those between the family dummy and the externally oriented dimensions of CSR 
(i.e., the environment, the community and customers) are weaker. Nonetheless, it should be taken into 
account that such negative correlations may be capturing a size effect, since larger firms seem to invest 
more in social activities (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990), and it has been argued that family firm preferences 
for SEW protection may have a negative impact on their size (Gómez-Mejía, et al., 2007). Multivariate 
analyses are necessary to provide a more qualified test of Hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
 
The national CSR standard measure, approached in terms of the distance between the country the firm 
belongs to and the USA, correlated negatively with the five CSR dimensions. This suggests that, as 
expected, the more dissimilar the country is to the USA, the weaker the social performance of firms. This 
aligns with the notion that the existence of standards, norms, and ultimately, pressures towards the 
adoption of certain practices in a given country, increases the number of firms that adhere to such 
















Table 3.1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
Mean S.D. Governance Employees Environment Community Customers Family National Std. 
distance 
Governance 53.48 9.85 1 
Employees 56.30 9.49 0.755 *** 1 
Environ-
ment 
54.54 10.45 0.714 *** 0.726 *** 1 
Community 51.39 9.19 0.735 *** 0.760 *** 0.753 *** 1 
Customers 49.84 11.35 0.549 *** 0.520 *** 0.682 *** 0.535 *** 1 







3.76 2.05 -0.266 *** -0.243 *** -0.048 * -0.208 *** 0.045 0.189 *** 1 
HT sector 0.39 0.49 0.002 0.018 0.021 -0.041 0.175 *** 0.027 0.13 *** 
Declin
ing.P. 














Firm age 3.75 0.92 -0.067 ** -0.063 ** -0.005 -0.036 0.083 *** 0.153 *** 0.197 *** 
Tobin’s Q 1.53 0.83 -0.093 *** -0.051 * -0.096 *** -0.055 * 
-
0.049 
* 0.024 -0.054 * 
Cost of 
debt 






HT sector Declining P. Volatility Firm size Firm age Tobin’s Q Debt 
HT sector 1 
Declining P. 0.036 1 
Volatility -0.002 -0.081 *** 1 
Firm size -0.057 * 0.006 -0.190 *** 1 
Firm age 0.060 ** 0.002 -0.007 0.102 *** 1 
Tobin’s Q 0.150 *** 0.054 * -0.192 *** -0.323 *** -0.088 *** 1 
Cost of 
debt 
-0.020 0.005 -0.007 -0.043 -0.025 0.025 1 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Table 3.2 summarizes the results of the panel data models to determine the effect of family firms on the 
hypothesized four dimensions. There is a negative, and highly significant effect of the family on the two 
internal dimensions (i.e., governance and employees) that provides strong support for Hypothesis 1a. 
However, the impact of this dummy on the three external dimensions of CSR, namely the environment, the 
community and customers, was non-significant. Therefore, there was no significant difference between the 
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wxternally oriented social activity of family and non-family firms, resulting in Hypothesis 1b not being 
supported.7 
 
Table 3.2: Panel data estimations for the influence of family firms on CSR 
 Governance Employees Environment Community Customers 
Family firm -3.150 *** -2.430 *** -1.026  -1.894  -0.374  
National std. 
distance 
-1.500 *** -1.400 *** -0.657 *** -1.049 *** -0.318  
HT sector 1.515 * 1.546 *** 1.386 * 0.140  4.471 *** 
Declining P. 0.191 * -0.134  -0.050  0.069  -0.272 * 
Volatility 7.461 *** 2.561 *** 5.554 *** 5.685 *** 7.384 *** 
Firm size 2.331 *** 2.021 *** 2.531 *** 1.822 *** 2.412 *** 
Firm age -0.218  -0.027  0.136  -0.252  1.063 * 
Tobin’s Q -0.338  -0.189  -0.711 * -0.350 * -1.268 ** 
Cost of debt -0.001  -0.001  -0.004  -0.011  0.002  
N 1771  1755  1741  1580  1518  
Wald X2 282.00 *** 215.56 *** 211.28 *** 131.31 *** 199.24 *** 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
To test Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 3 we estimated two separate models, one for the subsample of family 
firms, and another for the subsample of non-family firms. Table 3.3 summarizes the results of this 
estimation process. The variable national standard distance was, with the exception of the customer 
dimension, highly significant, and with the expected sign, in the subsample of non-family firms. However, it 
was only significant for the governance dimension in the subsample of family firms. This provides support 
for Hypothesis 2a. 
 
Table 3.3: Panel data estimations on the determinants of CSR in family (FF) and non-family (NFF) 
firms. 
 Governance Employees Environment 
 FF  NFF  FF  NFF  FF  NFF  
             
National 
std. 
distance -0.848  -1.567 *** -0.328  -1.539 *** -0.431  -0.691 *** 
HT sector -2.130  2.110 *** -1.603  2.008 *** -1.781  1.889 ** 
Declining 
P. -0.176  0.206 * -0.762  -0.108  -1.718 *** 0.015  
             
Volatility 8.538 ** 7.485 *** 6.411 * 2.230 * 4.050  5.931 *** 
Firm size 2.055 *** 2.368 *** 1.279 ** 2.135 *** 1.610 * 2.625 *** 
Firm age 0.023  -0.191  -0.255  0.086  1.652  0.027  
Tobin’s Q -0.904  -0.216  -0.831  -0.060  -1.567  -0.611  
Cost of 
debt 1.001  -0.001  0.019  -0.001  0.034  -0.004  
             
N 290  1471  288  1467  286  1553  
Wald X2 41.41 *** 249.80 *** 25.90 ** 193.77 *** 37.50 *** 139.39 *** 
             
                                                 
7 We reran the analysis using the continuous “family ownership” variable, which measures the percentage of shares 
owned by the focal family in each of the sampled years.  The measure has been the most common proxy used to 
capture the intensity of SEW in prior studies and has been validated in many articles in top journals (e.g., Berrone et al. 
2010; Gomez-Mejia 2007; Gomez-Mejia, et al. 2011). As expected, the family ownership variable had a negative and 
significant effect on social initiatives related to internal stakeholders. Its effect on external practices was also 
insignificant as was the case when using the dummy variable. Thus, our conclusions remain unchanged. 
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 The effect of industry conditions, represented in our analyses by the technological intensity of the sector 
in which the firm operates, was also non-significant for family firms but was positive and highly significant, 
with the exception of the community dimension, for non-family firms. This indicates that while non-family 
firms’ social activity is greater in technologically intense sectors, family firms show similar social behavior 
irrespective of the industry and its characteristics. This provides support for Hypothesis 2b. 
 Finally, we also found differences between the two subsamples in terms of the influence of declining 
performance on firms’ CSR policy. More specifically, and as predicted, the influence of the variable that 
captured firm performance evolution on CSR dimensions was negative in the family firm subsample. 
However, this negative effect was only significant for the environment and customer dimensions, and was 
not significant for governance, employees or the community. Interestingly, the influence of this variable on 
the non-family firm subsample was positive and significant for the governance dimension. This indicates a 
different reaction, in terms of social activities, to declining performance between family and non-family 
firms. While family firms tend to reduce their social activity, particularly in external dimensions, non-family 
firms tend to increase activities in the internal governance dimension. These findings support Hypothesis 3. 
We ran additional analyses to test the endogenous nature of the family firm variable in our sample, one of 
which was a pooled regression, for each of the four CSR dimensions, with instrumental variables using 
robust standard errors that took into account the clustered nature of the panel data set. In addition, we ran 
a treatment regression that considered individual clustering. The results demonstrate there was no 
endogeneity bias in our panel data estimations.  
3.5. Discurssion and conclusion 
Our theoretical and empirical analyses provide new ways of understanding the role of ownership 
structures in the adoption of practices to respond to different stakeholder demands, and thus provide 
several academic and practical contributions.  
Contributions to research 
While prior literature in the area has studied the role of family ownership and CSR, there has been 
debate about how this influences social practices. The distinction between internal and external 
stakeholders, and the acknowledgment of the multidimensional nature of SEW, sheds light and helps 
reconcile contrasting positions. Our work shows that family firms can spur social initiatives and be as 
socially responsible as non-family firms, when they are linked to external stakeholders (as a way to protect 
their reputation and image, and thus increase their SEW). At the same time, they abate social practices 
when they are oriented towards internal stakeholders (as a way to secure control and emotional bonds, 
and enhance their SEW). Thus, SEW can be a “double-edged sword” eliciting both socially responsible 
and irresponsible behavior in family firms, having both a bright and a dark side. The negative effect of the 
family firm on the employee dimension of CSR seems surprising in light of the numerous studies 
suggesting that family businesses tend to manifest a deep sense of personal responsibility towards their 
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employees (e.g., Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006). Our proposed framework also reconciles these 
apparently contradictory findings. We show that families are reluctant to attend employees’ claims 
regarding social practices, if they have the potential to challenge family control over the business or put 
family employees at risk. Thus, although family owners may be aware of the instrumental value of social 
behavior in terms of internal stakeholders, the need to guarantee family control over company operations 
leads them to neglect this, and they become short-sighted in this respect. 
 The lack of support for the hypothesis predicting the positive effect of family ownership on social 
activities aimed at external stakeholders also merits some discussion, in light of accumulated findings that 
demonstrate that family control induces CSR activities. While we failed to find support for hypothesis 1b, 
results indicate that when it comes to external stakeholders, family firms are not significantly different from 
non-family firms. We interpret this as a balancing process in which family firms engage, acting in socially 
responsible terms towards external stakeholders (at least to an extent which is comparable with non-family 
firms) while behaving less responsibly towards internal stakeholders. Moreover, the fact that our results do 
not confirm previous evidence showing that family firms engage more actively in initiatives aimed at 
external stakeholders, such as the environment (Berrone et al., 2010), can be explained in the national 
contexts in which our research was conducted (European countries). Differences with respect to prior work 
can be explained, at least partially, as a consequence of national differences. When we considered 
differences in terms of national standards, this was done with respect to the USA as a reference point. 
However, we believe that issues at regulatory level (e.g., specific environmental laws and norms, 
regulatory stringency and enforcement mechanisms), may explain the different results. Future research 
should investigate to what extent these differences interact with the identity of the owners (i.e. family 
versus non-family), to explain cross-national variations in company responses to stakeholder claims.  
 Our work also contributes to the growing literature that frames phenomena under the SEW 
approach. Our evidence, suggesting that the underlying drivers that push social initiatives in both 
ownership forms are significantly different, confirms the uniqueness of family company identity, through the 
use of SEW as a reference point to guide strategic decisions (Berrone, et al., 2012). Going further, our 
results indicate that because family firms use SEW preservation as a reference point rather than using far-
off targets defined by institutional factors (i.e., national standards or industry conditions), they are less 
likely to “follow the norm” when responding to social claims from internal and external stakeholders. 
However, concern with SEW preservation also implies that family firms’ social practices will be more 
responsive to organizational factors that may jeopardize family SEW, and specifically to the evolution of 
firm performance. As noted, family firms tend to reduce their externally oriented social activities when 
faced with a decline in performance. This finding is in line with previous research (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; 
Gómez-Mejía, et al., 2007) that shows how the strategic behavior of family firms varies when firm survival 
is perceived to be at stake. Interestingly, the evidence provided shows that non-family firms react in a 
different, and to some extent, unexpected way when they face weakening economic performance. 
Contrary to their family counterparts, our results suggest that non-family firms are more prone to engage in 
governance-improving activities as performance deteriorates. A cynical interpretation of this is that 
managers of non-family firms use social initiatives in a context of decreasing performance as a tool to 
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entrench themselves in the firm (Cespa & Cestone, 2009). An alternative explanation may lie in the 
instrumental approach to stakeholder management that suggests that firms use social practices as an 
instrument to gain legitimacy, reputation, and other critical intangible assets to operate in a given context 
(Hillman & Keim, 2001).  
Overall, our results show that family firms do not operate in a vacuum and that institutional and 
organizational factors can affect the way they function and operate. Family firms’ relative isolation from 
external forces and their greater sensitivity to organizational factors has an almost homogeneous effect 
across internal and external CSR dimensions. However, future research should examine the specific effect 
of these factors by stakeholder type. Similarly, additional institutional and organizational factors should be 
included in this analysis.  
Contributions to practice 
Managers who are keen to pursue social actions need to know that their chances of adoption are 
contingent on the firm’s ownership structure. The chances of implementing practices are higher in family 
firms, as long as they are related to external stakeholders. However, if managers intend to focus on actions 
that improve the conditions of internal stakeholders, they will encounter resistance in family firms. 
Paradoxically, family firms see these practices (or the lack of them) as a valuable way to preserve their 
socio-emotional endowments. 
As noted, we have observed that, compared to their non-family counterparts, family firms decisions 
concerning social actions are less influenced by external managerial trends and standards. Such relative 
isolation may be an advantage for family firms, to the extent that this can protect the firm from 
management practices that are simply fads, and are not driven by efficiency considerations. However, 
there is also a flip side, as family firms may lag behind in the adoption of practices that, at least in certain 
contexts, are deemed to have a positive impact on firm results. Family firm managers should be aware of 
these circumstances and engage themselves in the search for truly efficient management practices. 
Limitations 
Our work has its limitations. At least four aspects must be highlighted. Firstly, we did not measure 
SEW directly, but instead proxied it by using a dummy that considers both family ownership, and a family 
member on the board of directors. Although this is not perfect, we believe it is a valid initial approach for a 
SEW construct, for several reasons. Family ownership has been the most common proxy used to capture 
the intensity of SEW in prior studies and many articles in top journals have validated it (Berrone et al. 2010; 
Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Gómez-Mejía, el al. 2011). Moreover, as the concentration of company 
ownership in family hands increases, the family has greater influence over the firm’s strategic decisions 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Miller et al., 2010), reinforcing the control dimension of SEW, the level of 
personal attachment and identification, and the emotional bonds between family members and the firm 
(French & Rosenstein, 1984). In addition, as Berrone et al. (2012) argued, the percentage of shares owned 
by a family is “perhaps the only available alternative when using large archival databases” (p. 264). 
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Additionally, controlling family influence over company affairs increases with the presence of at least one 
member on the board of directors (Anderson et al., 2003). Nonetheless, future research should try to 
measure SEW and its link to CSR directly.  
Secondly, our distance variable considered the USA as our reference point. We noted the use of 
country distances, as proxies for the relative presence of high standards for CSR, demands the selection 
of a reference country with high CSR standards. This limitation should be kept in mind when implementing 
this approach. We also ran our analyses taking a European country, the United Kingdom, as a reference. 
Results (available on request) are very similar to those obtained when the USA was used as our 
benchmark. However, we consider that future research should explore the availability of alternative 
measures to capture national CSR standards. 
Thirdly, our empirical setting only took in publicly traded firms. Subsequent studies should explore 
these relations in privately-owned companies. While it is widely agreed that publicly held companies are 
more exposed to institutional pressures, further studies should examine how family control issues and 
emotional bonds interact with CSR outcomes in the case of private family firms. Moreover, private family 
firms are likely to use less formal internal and external practices.  In fact, as we see it, the formality of 
social practices in the case of listed firms can be a valid response to an important stakeholder: the 
shareholders. Future studies should address what happens to the relationship between family influence 
and CSR in contexts in which this formality is not required, as is the case of privately-owned firms. 
Moreover, although including firms that were listed for the entire 2001-2010 period avoided the effect 
of new entrants, it does not completely rule out the presence of survivor bias. Nonetheless, we explored 
this issue by looking at the firms excluded from our sample. Evidence indicated that they were not 
included, in most cases, as a result of missing data, or because the firm stopped trading as public 
concerns. Only a handful of them went bankrupt. We interpret this as evidence that survival bias was not a 




This study reveals that the SEW protection concern that characterizes family firms leads them to show a 
double face in their relationships with stakeholders. While they are as responsible as non-family firms in 
their relationships with external stakeholders, they show a more restrictive behavior with internal ones. 
Such behavior is less influenced by external norms and standards, but is more sensitive to performance 
decline.  
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CHAPTER IV: FAMILY CEO SATISFACTION: THE ROLE OF NON-ECONOMIC GOALS 
4.1 Introduction 
A central premise of the field of family business studies is that family and non-family firms behave 
differently owing to the different goals and preferences of dominant families (Chua, Chrisman, and 
Sharma, 1999). A manifestation of these differences frequently mentioned in theory and increasingly used 
in empirical research is the importance that family owners concede to non-economic outcomes (Corbetta 
and Salvato, 2004; Sharma et al., 1997; Shepherd, forthcoming; Tagiuri and Davis, 1992). These non-
economic outcomes, commonly referred in the literature as socioemotional wealth (SEW) (Gómez-Mejía et 
al., 2007), include elements such as the emotional attachment to the family business, the desire to keep 
effective control of the firm, or the intention to pass the firm to future generations (Berrone et al., 2012). It 
has been argued that decision making in family firms is driven by family firms’ favoring of objectives related 
to the creation of SEW over objectives related to creation of economic wealth (Cruz, Gómez-Mejía, and 
Becerra 2010). While the SEW preservation goal of family firm is unquestioned (e.g., Jaskiewicz and 
Astrachan, forthcoming), a key ongoing debate in the family firm literature centers on understanding how 
non-economic goals (i.e. SEW) are formed and balanced against pure economic goals, and how they 
evolve and change across generations (Zellweger et al., 2012; Schulze and Kellermans, 2015; Chua et al., 
2015). In fact, there are growing calls for a more precise approach to SEW to continue progressing in our 
understanding of family firms and, by extension, of the importance and impact of non-economic factors in 
firm’s management and decisions (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2014; Schepers et al., 2014). In this matter, 
we have recently witness some attempts to develop survey based instruments and procedures to measure 
SEW (Berrone et al., 2012; Schepers et al., 2014, Zellweger et al., 2012). Hence, an assessment of 
whether SEW value exists in combination with the economic goals and how this equation varies across 
different family firms is important to the theory of the family firm. 
The goal of the present study is to analyze and explore the relevance of non economic goals in family firms 
and its evolution across generations. Specifically, we seek to assess the relevance of non-economic goals 
in family firms and its evolution by analyzing the impact of past economic performance on the overall CEO 
satisfaction with the firm, both in comparison with non-family firms and across family firm of different 
generations. Understanding satisfaction with the firm is relevant since satisfaction determines, to a great 
extent, the decision to continue and invest more time and resources in the firm, or to leave the field 
(Cooper and Artz, 1995; Delgado-Garcia et al., 2012). However, to our knowledge research on satisfaction 
has focused essentially on employees, and little attention has been paid to owners (Walker and Brown, 
2004) or top managers (Cooper and Artz, 1995, Mahto et al., 2010). Top managers or CEO satisfaction in 
the context of family firms has been studied regarding the satisfaction with the job (Daily and Near, 1999) 
or the satisfaction with the succession process of family firms (Di Massis, et al. 2012) but not the general 
satisfaction with the firm. Daily and Near, (1999) argued that it is likely that owners of smaller firms, who 
also manage the operations of those firms, are likely to experience high job satisfaction just as a result of 
their ownership and involvement in the business.  
Cooper and Artz (1995) suggested that satisfaction is referent dependent. They noted that individuals’ 
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balance their expectations with actual rewards or performance, and that these individuals are more 
satisfied when their expectations are met. In this study, we combine the prospect theory with the SEW 
approach to model the overall satisfaction of the CEO with the firm. Prospect theory is one of the principal 
behavioral utility models proposed as alternatives to the expected utility model of decision making under 
risk (Starmer, 2000). The theory states that people make decisions based on the potential value of losses 
and gains rather than on the final outcome, and that people evaluate these losses and gains against a 
reference point. An important implication of prospect theory is that the way economic agents subjectively 
frame an outcome or transaction in their mind against this reference point affects the utility they expect or 
receive, and thus affect their overall levels of satisfaction. As it has been indicated previously, SEW 
preservation has been argued to be the main reference point for controlling families in family firms 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). We conjecture that since the majority of controlling families in family firms 
emphasize SEW protection goals over pure economic goals (Arregle et al., 2005; Gómez-Mejía et al., 
2007; Berrone et al., 2010; Mahto et al., 2010), the impact of firm economic performance on global 
satisfaction with the firm will be weaker than in non-family firms. That is, the impact of pure economic 
measures of performance will be more salient on non-family firms. 
Implicit in this claim is the assumption that “family firms” form a homogeneus group. However, that is not 
the case. It has been noted that family firms differ in their balance of economic and non-economic goals 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010; Mahto et al., 2010). The question then is to understand how such balance 
varies. The generation running the firm seems to be a relevant factor. Several family firm scholars (e.g. 
Cruz et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Zellweger et al., 2008; Zellweger and Astrachan, 2008) have 
suggested that SEW protection concerns are stronger in early development stages of the family firm, and 
that such concerns weaken as the firm moves into later stages. Zellweger et al (2012) showed that the 
emotional value will be contingent on whether the owner has the opportunity to hand the firm over to a next 
family generation, that is, whether the ownership stake develops such a kin-keeping role. These authors 
discussed the factors that influence the financial value of the firm, suggesting two components: the cash 
flow value (objective measure) and the private benefits (subjective measure) that are available when the 
firms has concentrated ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). So, while they do not deal directly with 
satisfaction, they are able to provide an approach to the value of SEW in monetary terms, that similar to 
our approach, is computed in terms of the difference with economic outcomes. Thus, the development 
stage of a family firm might indeed be a further factor affecting emotional value. Consistent with all this 
previous research on family firms we propose that generational aspects influence the balance between 
economic and non-economic goals among family firms. We argue that SEW evolves across generations 
and consequently the importance of firm performance for satisfaction with the business also evolves. 
Specifically, we hypothesized that pure economic goals gain relevance over SEW protection ones with 
generations, and therefore that CEO’s satisfaction levels with the firm are more dependent upon firm 
performance in second and subsequent generations than in the first one. 
In a similar vein, threats to firm survival, and thereby to SEW, may lead family firms to pay more attention 
to economic goals in times of economic difficulties (Chrisman and Patel, 2012). Previous studies have 
largely neglected the role of contextual factors that amplify or mute the relationship between past 
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performance and satisfaction. So, we will also analyze the effect of positive or negative firm performance 
since this is a key variable in understanding the decision making and it is shown to have an impact on 
family owners’ SEW preservation goals (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Thus, moving forward our 
understanding of the heterogeneity of family firm, we also try to study the differences in satisfaction when 
the business is not going as expected. March and Shapira (1992) argued that under declining 
performance, firms tend to shift their attention from aspirations to survival, emphasizing the dangers rather 
than the gains. Thus, we argue than when performance is negative family firms may shift their reference 
point from SEW to economic goals and consequently the assessment of their satisfaction with the firm will 
be more contingent upon firm’s economic performance.  
In sum, the chapter makes several contributions. First, it proves the relevance of the non-economic goals 
in family firms relative to financial objectives. We provide evidence that family involvement create 
socioemotional wealth for family firms and that influences the families’ satisfaction with the firm beyond 
pure economic performance. In this vein, the chapter adds to the growing literature on family firms that 
looks at how SEW preservation motives drive the perceptions of family firms. Being able to control for the 
pure economic performance of the firms, the results of the present chapter may provide additional 
evidence to indirectly measure and help understand the importance of the non-economic goals in the 
global satisfaction measure of family firms. Second, the study contributes to one of the central topics in the 
literature of family firms these days: the understanding of the heterogeneity of family firms. We note that 
the importance of SEW, and therefore the balance of economic and non-economic (i.e. SEW) goals, varies 
with generations. We argue that over generations SEW evolves and pure economic goals gain relevance, 
and therefore propose that the impact of past economic performance on satisfaction with the firm increases 
over generations. Third, we contribute to the scarce literature in the determinants of satisfaction with the 
business for firm managers. It is relevant to note that existing research has focused essentially on 
satisfaction with firm economic performance. We do not restrict ourselves to economic performance but 
focus on general satisfaction with the firm, and therefore reflect satisfaction with both economic and non-
economic (i.e. SEW) aspects of the firm. Besides, unlike prior works, we also take into account 
organizational factors such as the negative performance of the firm. When the economic performance is 
negative, the importance of the non-economic goals for family business would also change. So, the 
relevance of these goals will not only depend on the generation but also on the performance context. An 
additional interesting feature of our study is that our hypotheses are tested in a representative sample of 
small Spanish firms. Since the data are easier to obtain, most previous studies about SEW are based on 
publicly held companies, . We are able in this study to find out the SEW specificities of private held firms, 
which has not been studies with much detail.   
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the theoretical framework and the resulting 
hypotheses. Section three, contains information about the database and the variables employed to test the 
hypotheses of the study. Section four, presents the results of the empirical analysis. The final section of the 
chapter is devoted to the discussion. 
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4.2 Theoretical framework 
4.2.1 Satisfaction with the firm in family and non-family firms 
Satisfaction with the firm is a crucial measure of firm performance, particularly in the case of small and 
medium sized companies, where the influence of founders and owners may be strong (Powell and 
Eddleston, 2013), because it significantly influences the decision to continue in the business or the 
decision to invest more resources and time on it. Past research on satisfaction in family firms (e.g. Mahto 
et al., 2010) has focused exclusively on satisfaction with firm’s economic performance. However, we have 
discussed that controlling families highly regard non-economic goals (SEW). Further, they may even 
emphasize SEW over economic performance. It is not that family firms do not pay attention to economic 
goals, but that SEW (i.e. non-economic goals) are highly regarded in this firms (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010; 
Berrone et al., 2010) and may balance both (Mahto et al., 2010). Therefore, a more complete view of 
satisfaction with the firm, particularly in the case of family firms, cannot only be restricted to satisfaction 
with economic performance but should also take SEW into consideration (Zellweger et al., 2012).  
Consistent with previous research (e.g. Daily and Near, 1999) we define satisfaction with the firm or 
business as the extent to which the results obtained by the company (economic and non-economic) meet 
or surpass the expectations of its managers. Thus, levels of satisfaction are reference dependent. 
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986) links individuals’ 
satisfaction with subjectives assessments of results relative to reference points chosen by the individual. 
According to prospect theory, the way economic agents subjectively frame an outcome or transaction in 
their mind affects the utility they expect or receive, and thus affect their overall levels of satisfaction. 
Prospect theory makes some assumptions about risky decision making (Levy, 1992). First, decisions are 
not based on final wealth but on gains and losses relative to a reference point. Second, outcomes are 
assigned a subjective preference value using a value function that is steeper on the loss side than the gain 
side in the neighborhood of the reference point. Third, the decision maker weights the outcome 
preferences by subjective probabilities instead of the objective probabilities. The subjective probabilities 
systematically overstate low probabilities and understate high probabilities. Finally, the impacts of gains 
and losses relative to the reference point exhibit diminishing sensitivity (Chua et al, 2015). Thus, the overall 
preference value for a particular alternative decision/action is calculated as the sum of the subjective 
preference values for the gains/losses associated with each possible outcome, weighted by the subjective 
probabilities. The decision maker then chooses the decision/action with the highest overall preference 
value (including economic and non-economic values).  
The family business literature has long stressed the unique characteristics and peculiarities of family firm 
identity (Kepner, 1983; Kets de Vries, 1993; Westhead, et al., 2002). Strategic outcomes of family firms are 
chosen with the intention of maximizing an utility function with two main components (SEW and pure 
economic outcomes). Controlling families in family firms would balance both economic and non-economic 
elements in their decision making, such as the emotional value (Zellweger et al., 2012), the IPO 
(Leitterstorf & Rau, 2014) or performance satisfaction (Mahto et al., 2010), but it is acknowledged that in 
family firms the main reference point to assess their situation and make decision is SEW. Hence, 
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according to prospect theory the assessment of the satisfaction of family members with the company will 
be primarily based on how the company is contributing to the family SEW (i.e. whether the family SEW has 
maintained or improved, or it has rather diminished). That is, the SEW approach to family firms and 
prospect theory suggest that the family members will be reluctant to evaluate the satisfaction with the firm 
based just on the past financial performance, but would primarily consider the non-economic factors (i.e. 
SEW). Thus, as compared with non-family firms, in family firms evaluation of satisfaction with the business 
will prenominantly consider the non-economic factors. As such family firms may react to past performance 
in a somewhat different way compared with nonfamily firms. Consequently, we expect that there are 
differences between family and non family firms in the past performance-satisfaction relationship, this 
relationship being weaker in the case of family firms due to the importance that controlling families place to 
SEW. Formally stated: 
Hypothesis 1: The impact of past financial performance on overall satisfaction with the firm in family firms 
will be lower than in non-family firms.  
4.2.2 The role of generations 
In most studies, family ownership is used as a proxy for the existence of SEW (e.g., Berrone et al., 2010; 
Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). In contrast to this, the family business literature has largely emphasized 
existing differences within family firms (Zahra, Hayton, & Salvato, 2004). However, to date these 
differences have barely been linked to SEW issues and calls have been made to bridge this gap (Chua et 
al., 2015; Zellweger et al., 2012). The SEW literature must reach beyond this oversimplification and explain 
the factors behind the varying sources and degrees of SEW. 
A key concept in the family business is the generation involved in the business. The SEW concept is 
projected on a generational perspective (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007) emphasizing that attitudes of family 
members differ across generations, thus affecting their capacity to influence the company’s strategic 
direction (Sonfield & Lussier, 2004). According to the SEW perspective, the degree of family identification, 
influence and personal investment in the firm changes as the company evolves across generations 
(Gersick et al., 1997; Schulze et al., 2003). Dyer (1988) and McConaughy and Phillips (1999) note the 
differences between first and following generations in family firms. For instance, it has been suggested that 
the family’s attachment to the organization is highest when the firm is owned and managed by the founding 
family and that it tends to weaken as the firm transitions into subsequent generations (Chua et al., 1999; 
Mishra & McConaughy, 1999; Schulze et al., 2003a). Based on that, Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) argue that, 
independently of financial considerations, losses in SEW should weigh less heavily on a family firm’s 
willingness to give up control as it moves from a founding–family-controlled and –managed firm to a firm 
that is owned by an extended family and professionally managed. Hence, strategic choices are more likely 
to be driven by economic considerations in later generations (Gómez-Mejía et al, 2007; Chen et al, 2010). 
In this vein, it seems that the emphasis on preserving the family’s SEW lessens as the firm moves through 
generations and that financial considerations become more important. Thus, the balance of economic and 
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SEW goals, and its influence on assessments of satisfaction with the firm, changes with the generations. 
Consequently the generation that is at the helm is a key factor to consider in order to reach a better 
understanding of how SEW evolves and is balanced against economic performance. Continuing with the 
approach used for hypothesis 1, and given the current difficulties to obtain a reliable direct measure of 
SEW, we explore this balance by looking at the importance that economic performance has on satisfaction 
for the business for different types of family firms. 
In this study we distinguish between the “Founder-family”, and the “second and next generation”. More 
specifically: (1) Founder-family: firms that are family firms and the founder is still present in the 
management of the firm. (2) Next-generation: firms that are family firms but the founder is not present on 
the board. Thus, the next generation of the founder is managing the firm. 
Since in first generation family firms only the founding generation is present, ownership structures tend to 
be more concentrated than in next generation (Gómez-Mejía et al, 2007). Therefore, it is easier for family 
members to maintain the SEW perspective and the fulfillment of non-economic goals as one of the main 
priorities of the firm. Thus, the weight of socioemotional values will be lower in second and next generation. 
Tha is, SEW losses its preminence as reference point, and makes the non-economic goals to be less 
important when evaluating the satisfaction with the company. Consequently, the importance of past 
financial performance on family CEO satisfaction in second and next generations should be higher than the 
founder generation, and similar to that in the non family firms. The balance between SEW and economic 
outcomes leans more to economic factors in second and next generations. Formally stated: 
Hypothesis 2: The impact of past financial performance on overall satisfaction with the firm will be higher 
for second and next generation family firms than for founder family firms.  
4.2.3 Negative versus positive performance and satisfaction in family firms 
Until now, we have studied the differences between the direct effect of economic performance on 
satisfaction in family and non-family firms, and we have also distinguished first and next generation family 
differences. But, what will happen if the economic performance goes down? When firms (family and non 
family) experience a decline in performance that may even put firm survival at stake, it may be advisable 
for them to focus scarce resources on core activities with more certain economic returns (Starbuck & 
Hedberg, 1977). In the case of family firms, Chrisman and Patel (2012) state, “as performance weakens, 
family firms are expected to frame decisions more negatively than non-family firms..., owing to the prospect 
of both economic losses and losses of socioemotional wealth” (p. 980). Therefore, the decisions made by 
family firms are more sensitive to negative performance than nonfamily firms. Thus, when the performance 
is negative, controlling families tend to pay more attention to the economic reference point and less to the 
SEW reference point. This leads to a change in the preminence of the factors being considered to assess 
the satisfaction with the company, with a greater relevance being attributed to pure economic outcomes. 
Hence, in the spirit of the previous hypotheses, we would expect the weight of past financial performance 
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on the satisfaction with firm to be bigger in context of negative performance. 
Hypothesis 3a: The impact of past financial performance on overall satisfaction with the firm will be higher 
for family firms with negative performance than for family firms with positive performance. 
We have formulated the last hypothesis for family firms in general, but we also able to go further and study 
the differences in the relative importance of financial performance in first and second and next generation 
family firms facing negative performance. Within family firms, we have just proposed that, although for all 
family firms the impact of financial performance on satisfaction with the firm will be higher in face of 
negative performance. We have also seen before that strategic choices are more likely to be driven by 
economic considerations in later generations of the family (Gómez-Mejía et al, 2007; Chen et al, 2010). 
Thus, it is likely that the balance of economic and SEW goals changes not only with the generations but 
also in face of negative performance. Specifically, our previous arguments lead us to expect that second 
and next generations family firms will give more importance to economic performance than the first 
generation family firms in context context of negative performance. Thus: 
Hypothesis 3b: In face of negative performance, the relationship between past performance and overall 
satisfaction with the firm will be greater for second and next generation than for founder firms. 
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Data collection 
The hypotheses of the study are going to be tested on a unique representative sample of Spanish small 
firms in high and medium technology manufacturing and service industries. The population of Spanish 
small firms in these industries was initially identified using the SABI database, the most comprehensive 
dataset of incorporated firms in Spain. First high and medium-high technology sectors (in both 
manufacturing and services industries) were identified using the classification of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the “Instituto Nacional de Estadística” (INE). 8 
Based on this industry classification we searched for firms between 10 and 50 employees whose primary 
or secondary activity code corresponded to one of those sectors. In addition we removed the few firms that 
were not incorporated businesses or limited partnerships (Wiklund et al., 2009), obtaining a total population 
of 10565 firms. A representative sample of 1500 firms was selected to guarantee industry and legal form 
8 INE is the Spanish National Institute of Statistics. 21 (manufacturing of pharmaceutical products), 26 (manufacturing 
of optical and electronic devices) and 303 (manufacturing of aeronautic and aerospace machines and products) are 
manufacturing high-tech sectors. Sectors 20 (chemical industry), 254 (weapon and ammunition manufacturing), 27 
(manufacturing of electric products), 28 (manufacturing of machines and equipment), 29 (car manufacturing), 302 
(manufacturing of railway products), 304 (manufacturing of military vehicles), 309 (manufacturing of other 
transportation materials) and 325 (manufacturing of medical instruments and supplies) are the medium-high 
technology manufacturing sectors. Finally sectors 59 (image and music recording and editing), 60 (radio and television 
broadcast), 61 (telecommunication), 62 (software programming and consulting), 63 (information services) and 72 
(research and development) are high-technology service sectors. 
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representativeness (sampling error was ±2.34% with a confidence level of 95%). Firms were randomly 
selected within each industry segment for a phone interview conducted between November and December 
of 2010 by a firm specialized in market studies with a large experience conducting similar research 
oriented interviews. 
97% of firms in the population were contacted and asked to participate. 1500 agreed to participate and 
responded to the questionnaire (14.20% response rate). The survey was answered by the manager of the 
firm. Interviews had an average duration of 27 minutes. Missing values reduce our effective sample to 
1314 for multivariate analyses (12.43% effective response rate). We found no differences in terms of size 
or industry between those that participate and those that refused to do so.  
Primary data was obtained from the survey questionnaire answered by the managers during the 
interviews. This was the core source of information to measure several key constructs of our model. This 
information was complemented with some secondary information obtained from the SABI data base 
achieving a unique and original collection of data. 
4.3.2 Variable measurement 
Dependent 
Satisfaction. It captures the level of satisfaction with the progress of the company.  We measure 
satisfaction with the firm using a single item (Block et al., Carree and Verheul) that questions about the 
overall satisfaction with the firm. Hence it does not only consider financial performance but a broader set of 
factors, and therefore is suited to capture the influence of non-economic factors (or the influence of factors 
beyond pure economic performance on satisfaction). Our measure, as other studies such as Cooper and 
Artz, (1995), asked respondents to assess their "personal overall satisfaction with their business." The item 
was measured in a 5-point Likert scale. (1=totally satisfied, 5= Not satisfied at all). 
Independent 
Past Performance. It is measured as the mean of the operating results (in thousands) of the last three 
years prior to the survey (Zahra, Hayton, and Salvato, 2004; Zahra, 2005), (i.e. 2007-2008-2009) divided 
by the number of the employees.  
Negative Performance. It is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when the firm's past performance, 
measured as indicated above, is negative and zero otherwise. 
Family firms. The literature on family firm is somewhat disperse and it is difficult to find consensus on the 
exact definition of a family firm. However, the typical family firm has been characterized as an organization 
controlled and usually managed by multiple family members (Shanker and Astrachan, 1996; Lansberg, 
1999), often from multiple generations (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). For 
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example, McConaughy et al. (1998) consider as a family firm any company run by a founder or member of 
the founding family. Similarly, Anderson and Reeb (2003), Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003), Faccio and Lang 
(2002), La Porta et al. (1999), Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999), Barth et al. (2005) consider family firm any 
business in which a founding family or founding individual own a fraction of the company or serve on the 
board of directors. In these categorizations the cut-off points for ownership percentage vary, often 
dependent on whether the firm is publicly owned or not. Villalonga and Amit (2006) examine a wide variety 
of definitions, encompassing different levels and generations of individual- or family-ownership and/ or 
management. Other studies consider involvement by multiple members of the same family over time, by 
counting as family firms only those in which several family members are acting as owners or managers of 
the business.  
In our study, family firm (FF) is defined as any firm where the family controls directly or indirectly more than 
50 percent of the shares. 54.59 percent of the firms in our sample meet this definition of family firms. 
For the robustness check, we also define family management (FM) when family controls directly or 
indirectly more than 50 percent of the shares and the CEO of the firm is also family member. Furthermore, 
we also check our hypothesis with another restrictive definition of family firm: the family control (FC) that 
takes value 1 when family controls directly or indirectly more than 50 percent of the shares and at least one 
family members  are present on the board of the directors. 
Further, as advanced in the hypotheses we distinguish two different types of family firms: 
Founder_family. They are firms that are family firms and the founder is still present in the management of 
the firm.  
Next_gen. They are firms that are family firms but the founder is not present on the board. Thus, the next 
generation of the founder is managing the firm. 
Control variables. We control for the respondents´ demographic characteristics, specifically age, education 
and experience. This approach accounts for the view of Upper echelons theorists where a close 
relationship exists between a person’s demographic characteristics, her cognitive bases and value, and in 
turn her strategic preferences and dispositions (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992): 
Educational level. It is the highest educational level that the manager has reached. It is measured by a 
dummy variable that takes value 1 he or she has universities studies or higher (master or doctorate) and 0 
otherwise. Experience. Number of years of labour experience in the same industry sector. Finally, Age 
manager (AgeM) is a variable that measures the age of the manager of the firm. 
Respondents from large organizations (e.g., Gómez-Mejía et al., 2003) or within growing industries (e.g., 
Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003) are likely to have different perceptions of performance. Hence, we control 
for the firm characteristics and industry conditions. Firm size (Size) captures the number of employees of 
the firm and was captured by a question in the survey instrument. It is measured as a dummy variable 
taking the value 1 when the firm has more than 20 employees, and 0, when the firm has between 10 to 20 
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employees. (Correa et al., 2007; OECD, 1995). Serv is a dummy variable that takes value one when the 
firm belongs to a service sector and 0 when it belongs to a industry sector.  Age is also common control 
variable in small firm research as it may capture differences in behavior and performance due to culture 
and generation issues. Firm age is computed as the difference between 2010, the year the survey was 
administered, and the year the facility or plant was founded. Under-resourced (U_R) is another variable 
that measure if the availability of capital has been inadequate and a major impediment to successful 
business development.  
We have also control for entrepreneurial orientation as the individuals with strong entrepreneurial 
orientations are willing to take on high-risk projects in exchange for potentially high returns and satisfaction 
at individual level (Miller, 1983): Entrepreneurial orientation (EO). It has been measured using well 
established scales. Specifically we employed 13 items proposed and employed by Covin and Slevin (1989) 
(risk taking, innovativeness and proactiveness), Lumpkin and Dess (1996) (autonomy) and Lumpkin and 
Dess (2001) (aggressiveness). As originally proposed all items were measured in a 7-point Likert scale. An 
exploratory factor analysis was conducted to confirm a single factor that made up the EO construct where 
was properly identified. As expected the factor analysis revealed the existence of one factor that explained 
64.1% of total variance. The single factor represents EO as the average value of the 13 items. This 
additional measure ranges between 1 and 7. The greater its value the greater the entrepreneurial 
orientation of the firm. 
4.3.3 Methodological approach 
First, we perform ordered probit analysis to compare the past performance and satisfaction relationship of 
family versus non-family firms (hypothesis 1). When a dependent variable has more than two categories 
and the values of each category have a meaningful sequential order where a value is indeed ‘higher’ than 
the previous one, and the data is following a normal distribution, ordinal probit is the most appropiate 
model to use. To test Hypothesis 2, we perform ordered probit analysis to compare previous relationship 
between founder and next generation firms. Finally, we also use ordered probit to test hypothesis 3a and 
3b making subsamples of firms experiencing positive and negative performance. The split sample method 
is appropriate when theory predicts independent-dependent variables relations by subgroups: (family vs. 
non-family) or (first vs. next generation) or (positive vs. negative performance). It makes sense when it is 
expected that the relationship between the dependent and independent variables, and not only the main 
independent, may be different between the two groups, because each model is somehow different. 
Besides, it has been extensively used in previous family business studies (Gómez-Mejía et al 2003; 
Berrone et al., 2010). We use robust standard errors in all our multivariate estimations. 
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4.4 Results 
The descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used in this study are reported in Table 4.1. 
55.29 percent of the firms in our sample are family firms and the remaining 44.71 percent are non-family. 
The mean value of satisfaction is 2.96 (on a scale from 1 to 5) while the mean value of the age of the firms 
are 24.28 years.  A close look at the values shows that past financial performance is positively correlated 
with satisfaction, but any of them have a significant relationship with our core variable, family firm. Family 
firm has significant relationship with the size and the age of the firms, and also with the industrial sector.  
Table 4.1: mean, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations. 
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1.Satisfaction 2.9653 0.0359 1 
2.Past. Perf 1.4772 0.9090 0.0998 ** 1 
3.EO 3.8084 0.0304 0.1275 *** -0.0354 1 
4.Size 0.5649 0.0174 0.1174 *** 0.0103 0.1122 *** 1 
5.U_R 2.7862 0.0520 -0.1839 *** -0.0356 -0.0012 -0.1061 *** 1 
6.Age 24.2818 0.6240 -0.1021 *** -0.0089 -0.0205 0.0456 + 0.0024 
7.AgeM 45.6501 0.3618 -0.0585 * -0.0177 0.0103 -0.0129 0.02 
8.Network 2.7386 0.0235 0.0147 -0.0364 0.0568 * 0.0267 0.0666 * 
9.Edu. level 0.6885 0.0163 0.0315 0.0196 0.0928 *** 0.211 *** -0.0529 * 
10.Experienc
e 19.7688 0.3993 -0.0793 
** 
-0.0229 -0.0254 -0.0494 
+ 
0.0127 
11.Serv 0.2979 0.0161 0.0895 *** -0.0173 0.0768 ** 0.0416 -0.0369 
12.FF 0.4586 0.0175 -0.0096 -0.018 0.0327 0.089 *** 0.0293 
Significance levels are based on a two-tailed test, +: p<0.1; *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001 
Multivariate analyses are necessary to provide a more nuanced test of Hypotheses 1 which is shown in 
Table 4.2. This first column shows Model 1 where entrepreneurial orientation and size have a positive and 
significant impact on satisfaction. However, firm age, firm difficulties to access to resources and manager 
experience have a negative and significant impact on satisfaction. This indicates that firms with high EO, 
and bigger firms will have better satisfaction. However, older firms and firm difficulties to access to 
resources will have less satisfaction. 
The second column of Table 4.2 (Model 2) shows that the past financial performance has a positive impact 
on satisfaction controlling for all the previous variables. Besides, the family firm variable has no significant 
effect on satisfaction. Furthermore, we run a t-test analysis in order to know if there are differences in 
mean between family and nonfamily firms in the level of satisfaction. Thus, by itself, the family business is 
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
6.Age 1 
7.AgeM 0.1135 *** 1 
8.Network 0.0029 -0.0498 + 1 
9.Edu. level -0.0348 -0.135 *** -0.0106 1 










12.FF 0.1642 *** 0.0295 0.0461 + -0.0076 0.0363 -0.1896 *** 1 
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not different from the non family firms. That is, family firms are not more or less satisfied than their 
counterparts. Variance inflation factors indicate that our estimations are free of any multicollinearity 
problems (Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson, 2009). 
Table 4.2: Ordered probit in Family and Non-Family firms 
Model 3 
Satisfaction 
Model 1 Model  2 FF NFF 
Past. Perf 3.2570 ** 3.7929 3.2065 * 
EO 0.1364 *** 0.1326 *** 0.1663 * 0.0694 ** 
Size -0.2304 *** -0.2593 *** -0.3219 *** -0.1248 
U_R -0.1295 *** -0.1595 *** -0.1510 *** -0.1797 *** 
Age -0.0062 *** -0.0052 ** -0.0078 *** 0.0000 
AgeM 0.0030 0.0029 0.0011 0.0080 
Network 0.0281 -0.0017 -0.0573 0.1523 
Edu. Level -0.0817 -0.0808 -0.0935 -0.0570 
Experience -0.0079 + -0.0081 -0.0082 -0.0069 
Serv 0.0747 0.0844 -0.0009 0.2555 + 





*** -773.0245 *** -338.9009 *** 
P-R2 0.0292 0.0391 0.0459 0.0331 
N. Obs 1291 825 567 258 
Significance levels are based on a two-tailed test, +: p<0.1; *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001 
The third column of Table 4.2 (Model 3) shows the results of the OLS regression estimated to test 
Hypothesis 1. As can be seen, there is a positive and significant impact of past financial performance on 
satisfaction in non-family firms. However, this relationship is not significant in the sample of family firms, 
which support our first hypothesis. For family firms, the level of satisfaction is not impacted by the level of 
past financial performance as it is for non family firms, because family firms have other non-economic 
goals that are even more important than the pure economic ones. Family firms could be satisfied 
independently of the economic performance because they still have the control of the firm and because 
they can ensure the destination of the firm for future generations. The presence of the SEW is a kind of 
asset very valuable for family firms, that is why they can be generally satisfied even if the economic goals 
are not as expected.  
We also find differences between the two subsamples. The first column of table 4.3 shows that the impact 
of past financial performance on satisfaction in founder family firms is not significant. This means that for 
firms where the founder and his/her family are present the impact of past financial performance is not as 
important as for non family firms or for family firms governed and managed by next generation. The 
hypothesis 2 is also supported by the second column of table 4.3. For family firms managed by next 
generations, the impact of past financial performance is positive and significant.  Taking into account the 
SEW of the family firms, in second or following generations, the presence of SEW, should be lower than in 
the first generation (Gómez-Mejía et al, 2007). For next generations, the SEW perspective is not as 
important as the first generation, ownership structures tend to be more dispersed and they try to 
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professionalize in order to keep competitive. Thus, the importance of past financial performance on 
satisfaction should be higher than the first generation, and similar to the non family firms (first column of 
table 4.2), because the more generations are involved, the greater the dispersion of clear objectives and 
the lower the presence of non-economic factors. 
Table 4.3: Sub_samples: Family firm categories. 
Family_Founder Next_generation 
Past. Perf 0.7411 5.0262 *
EO 0.1629 ** 0.1691 +
Size -0.3023 ** -0.3509 **
U_R -0.1291 *** -0.1909 ***
Age 0.0041 -0.0109 ***
AgeM -0.0038 0.0068 
Network -0.0296 -0.0931 
Edu. Level -0.0774 -0.0972 
Exper -0.0159 + -0.0006 
Serv 0.0213 -0.0689 
Log pseudolikelihood -438.64245 *** -327.54769 *** 
P-R2 0.0383 0.0698 
N. Obs 318 249 
Significance levels are based on a two-tailed test, +: p<0.1; *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001 
Finally, we also have found differences between the positive and negative performance in second and next 
generation family firms. We cannot support the hypothesis 3a  (Model 4, table 4.4) because for family firms 
in general, there are not significant differences between positive and negative performance firms, but we 
support hypothesis 3b (Model 5-6, table 4.4), where we can see that not only the generation matter but 
also the performance context of the firm. It seems that when the firms are through economic difficulties, 
second and next generation family firms will give more importance to economic performance than the 
founder firms to the fear of losing everything.  
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Tabla 4.4: Family firms: Nevative and positive performance 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Satisfaction in FF Satisfaction in First generation Satisfaction in second and next 
generation 
Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive 
Past. Perf 2.5311 6.6240 -2.8945 5.6113 4.6178 * 3.6320 
EO 0.0222 0.0991 0.0474 0.1109 -0.0179 0.0547 
Size -0.0839 -0.2195 -0.1799 -0.0572 0.2771 -0.4696 
U_R -0.0769 + -0.1289 *** -0.0663 -0.0971 -0.1463 * -0.1923 ** 
Age -0.0079 * -0.0031 -0.0071 0.0201 + -0.0130 ** -0.0061 
AgeM 0.0049 0.0052 -0.0077 0.0135 0.0449 -0.0226 
Network 0.0093 -0.2166 * 0.0678 -0.1605 -0.1448 -0.2939 *
Edu. Level -0.1636 -0.2701 + -0.2050 -0.2022 -0.3681 -0.3624 
Experience -0.0101 -0.0131 -0.0092 -0.0310 ** -0.0104 0.0091 




-305.99 *** -218.91 *** -161.55 *** -132.86 *** -134.96 *** 
P-R2 0.0181 0.0408 0.201 0.0492 0.0865 0.0784 
N. Obs 287 280 168 150 119 129 
Significance levels are based on a two-tailed test, +: p<0.1; *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001 
4.4.1 Robustness check: Definition of family firm 
Consistent with the vast majority of the previous literature, our definition of family firm took ownership into 
account. However, in addition to ownership, family control of the firm may also manifest in family members 
holding key management positions. We first checked whether our conclusions change if we consider a 
more restrictive definition of family firm, one that besides ownership considers the management dimension. 
The first new variable took the value 1 if in addition to the minimum ownership requirement the CEO of the 
company is a family member. The second new variable took the value 1 if in addition to the minimum 
ownership requirement there were family members in the management team of the company and/or its 
board. In most cases, the controlling families also had members in the management team and/or the board 
of directors. This suggests that family ownership is closely linked to family management, and therefore one 
single condition (in this case ownership) correctly identifies the family firms in our sample. As can be seen 
in the results of the model 7 and 8 summarized in Table 4.5, results do not alter the conclusions drawn 
from previous analyses finding support for hypotheses 1. Specifically this model replicates the estimation 
of model 3 in Table 4.2.  
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Table 4.5: Robustness check of family firm definition 
Model 7 Model 8 
Satisfaction Satisfaction 
FM NFM FC NFC 
Past. Perf 9.6808 3.1476 * 3.7115 3.1304 * 
EO 0.1841 * 0.1214 ** 0.1236 0.1430 ** 
Size 0.0881 * 0.0859 ** 0.0789 *** 0.0918 + 
U_R -0.3695 ** -0.2322 *** -0.3894 *** -0.1632 *** 
Age -0.1654 -0.1444 ** -0.1822 ** -0.1300 
AgeM -0.0040 -0.0063 -0.0070 -0.0033 
Network 0.0041 0.0053 0.0019 0.0057 
Edu. level -0.0085 0.0152 -0.0855 0.0743 
Experience -0.1252 -0.0358 -0.1195 -0.0678 
Serv -0.0108 -0.0059 -0.0054 -0.0095 
FF 
Log -303.07433 *** -795.738 *** -467.66 *** -629.458 *** 
P-R2 0.0561 0.0331 0.0569 0.0304 
N. Obs 222 592 345 469 
Significance levels are based on a two-tailed test, +: p<0.1; *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001 
4.5 Conclusion and discussion 
Our theoretical and empirical analyses provide new ways of understanding the role of non economic 
factors (SEW) in the satisfaction construct and thus provide several academic and practical contributions. 
Contributions to academia 
Research comparing the financial performance of family and nonfamily firms has also uncovered both the 
positive and negative consequences of family involvement in family firms’ management. This study 
contributes to the family business literature by providing evidence that family involvement can create 
socioemotional wealth for family firms and that this influences the families’ satisfaction with the firm. 
Second, the paper adds to the growing literature on family firms that looks at how SEW preservation 
motives drive the perceptions of family firms. While the SEW preservation goal of family firm is 
unquestioned, a key ongoing debate in the family firm literature centers on understanding how economic 
and non-economic goals are balanced by these firms. Being able to control for the pure economic 
performance of the firms, the results of the present chapter may provide additional evidence to help 
understand the importance of the non-economic goals in the global satisfaction measure of family firms.  
Thirdly, the contrasting findings in the family business literature regarding the financial performance of 
family firms can be explained by the heterogeneity of family firms (Mazzi 2011; Olson et al. 2003). This 
paper establishes the heterogeneity of family firms’ strategies and thus the importance of paying closer 
attention to examining such strategic heterogeneity and explaining its sources in the family business 
research.  
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Lastly, the paper enhances the existing literature by considering a representative sample of small firms that 
are characterized by more flexible non-hierarchical structures, which may be the appropriate organizational 
forms in changing business environments (Yang and Chen 2009). 
Contributions to practice 
For managers, the findings suggest that particular goals, attitudes, and backgrounds are likely to be 
associated with greater satisfaction. This study casts light on why, in particular settings, some managers 
may be more satisfied than others. This may influence whether some managers stay with marginal 
businesses, keep on going with business when the financial performance is even negative, because the 
satisfaction is not an pure economic measurement. 
This paper shed light to why underperforming firms, defined as “organizations whose performance, by any 
standard, falls short… yet whose existence continues, sometimes indefinitely” (Meyer and Zucker, 1989, p. 
19) that have been described variously as “chronic failure firms”( van Witteloostuijn, 1998) or “living dead”
(Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1987; Ruhnka et al., 1992), are still alive (Gimeno et al., 1997). In the case of 
family firms, we suggest that because of the SEW, the family managers will remain in the firm because 
their general satisfaction will be good enough for them to stay in the business, although maybe the 
financial measure were not good as expected.  
Limitations and Concluding Remarks 
Our work is not free of limitations. At least four aspects should be highlighted. First, we don’t have a direct 
measure of SEW; rather we proxy it using family ownership and management. Although not perfect, we 
believe is a valid first-degree approximation to SEW construct. Nonetheless, future research should try to 
directly measure SEW and its link to satisfaction. To this end the ideas provided by Berrone et al. (2012) 
may be of great help. 
Secondly, the data that is cross-sectional. Cross-sectional studies can suggest correlations but do not 
allow researchers to infer causal relationships or effects over time. 
Thirdly, our sample consists entirely of Spanish firms, thus, any inference to other countries must be made 
with caution. Country-specific cultural and traditional influences may reduce the generalizability of our 
findings. 
Finally, data collection also captured a unique environmental context of economic and financial crisis. This 
added further difficulty to the already complex environment of firms in the high tech and medium-high tech 
industries, which is characterized by high degrees of dynamicity and stiff competition. This particularly 
harsh context may have reduced the latitude of action of firms, as well as influenced the impact of their 
decisions on subsequent firm performance. We extend a call to other researchers to explore the issues 
analyzed here to multiple cultural contexts, as well as to time periods absent of any global economic crisis. 
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In conclusion, the impact of past financial performance on satisfaction in family firms is lower because for 
these firms the SEW or non economic goals are very important in the subjective evaluation of satisfaction. 
Besides, taking into account the heterogeneity of family firms, we have shown that next generations will 
behave as non family firms because the presence of SEW is diluted over time and the level of general 
satisfaction with the company will be more influenced by the past financial performance. 
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CHAPTER V: GENERAL CONCLUDING REMARKS OF THE THESIS 
5. Concluding remarks
5.1 Theoretical and practical contributions 
The preceding three chapters have presented three studies that aimed at enhancing our understanding of 
the behavior and strategic decision making of family firms. Taken globally, they contribute to the family 
business literature linking the different behaviors of the family business to core elements such as the 
entrepreneurial orientation, the corporate social responsibilities and the general satisfaction with the firm.  
Based on the Spanish privately and publicly held firms of more than fifty employees, the first study has 
examined how socio-emotional factors can influence family firms’ commitment to entrepreneurially oriented 
activities, and how such effect could be moderated by the industry’s technological intensity and the family 
firm’s performance. The results show that family firms are less entrepreneurially oriented than non-family 
firms due to the pervasive influence of SEW protection motives in their decision making.  
We have also considered the decisive role of moderating factors (Rauch et al. 2009) examining the role of 
the technology intensity of the sector and firms’ economic difficulties. Consistent with our hypothesis, 
family firms in more technology-intense industries exhibit similar EO levels to those of non-family firms. In 
less technology-intense industries, however, family firms are significantly less entrepreneurially oriented 
than non-family firms, the reason being that, in technology-intense environments, failure to invest in 
entrepreneurship is riskier than actually making the investment. So, for firms competing in technologically 
demanding industries, investment in entrepreneurship is the price they have to pay to remain competitive. 
Indeed, family firms in this setting are more willing to sacrifice a portion of their SEW in order to keep their 
economic returns to a certain (aspirational) level. In less technology-intense sectors, however, where 
investment in EO is less crucial for firm survival, and the preservation of SEW therefore weights more 
heavily. Our analyses did not provide support for the moderating effect of the economic difficulties variable. 
Consistent with some recent evidence (e.g. Christman & Pattel, 2012) we expected the reference point for 
family firms to shift from SEW protection to economic considerations in the face of economic difficulties. 
The fact that we continue to find a lower degree of EO, irrespective of such problems signals that SEW 
protection is an enduring characteristic of family firms and significantly drives their decisions. These 
findings are of great relevance for family firm research. Extant research has, in line with our finding of lower 
EO in family firms, documented SEW protection as a major driver in the decision-making process of family 
firms. However, economic goals may sometimes conflict with the desire to protect SEW. Our study may 
provide evidence to help discern how family firms balance these two goals (i.e. economic and non-
economic) under different circumstances.  
This first study offers several suggestions and implications for family-firm managers. From a purely 
economic standpoint, it appears that family firms can benefit by increasing investment in EO (Rauch et al. 
2009), this is particularly true in the case of firms operating in technology intense sectors, where EO is 
fundamental to survival. Since increasing emphasis on EO may place SEW in jeopardy, families should 
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seek a balance between maximizing economic performance and preserving their identity (i.e. SEW). Since 
under-investing in EO can lead to opportunity loss and lack of competitiveness, the challenge for 
controlling families is to increase EO while preserving SEW.  
By investigating the corporate social responsibility of publicly held companies in Europe with market 
capitalization over €50 million, our theoretical and empirical analyses in chapter three provide new ways of 
understanding the role of ownership structures in the adoption of practices to respond to different 
stakeholder. While prior literature in the area has studied the role of family ownership and CSR, there has 
been debate about how this influences social practices. The distinction between internal and external 
stakeholders, and the acknowledgement of the multidimensional nature of SEW, sheds light and helps 
reconcile contrasting positions. Our work shows that family firms can spur social initiatives and be as 
socially responsible as nonfamily firms when they are linked to external stakeholders (as a way to protect 
their reputation and image, and thus increase their SEW). At the same time, they abate social practices 
when they are oriented toward internal stakeholders (as a way to secure control and emotional bonds, and 
enhance their SEW). Thus, SEW can be a “double-edged sword” eliciting both socially responsible and 
irresponsible behavior in family firms, having both a bright and a dark side. 
Our evidence, suggesting that the underlying drivers that push social initiatives in both ownership forms 
are significantly different, confirms the uniqueness of family company identity through the use of SEW as a 
reference point to guide strategic decisions (Berrone et al., 2012). Going further, our results indicate that 
because family firms use SEW preservation as a reference point rather than using far-off targets defined 
by institutional factors (i.e., national standards or industry conditions), they are less likely to “follow the 
norm” when responding to social claims from internal and external stakeholders. However, concern with 
SEW preservation also implies that family firms’ social practices will be more responsive to organizational 
factors that may jeopardize family SEW and specifically to the evolution of firm performance. As noted, 
family firms tend to reduce their externally oriented social activities when faced with a decline in 
performance. Overall, our results show that family firms do not operate in a vacuum and that institutional 
and organizational factors can affect the way they function and operate. 
From the managerial perspective, managers who are keen to pursue social actions need to know that their 
chances of adoption are contingent on the firm’s ownership structure. The chances of implementing 
practices are higher in family firms as long as they are related to external stakeholders. However, if 
managers intend to focus on actions that improve the conditions of internal stakeholders, they will 
encounter resistance in family firms. Paradoxically, family firms see these practices (or the lack of them) as 
a valuable way to preserve their socioemotional endowments. Family firm managers should be aware of 
these circumstances and engage themselves in the search for truly efficient management practices. 
Finally, the third study based on a unique representative sample of Spanish small firms in high and 
medium technology manufacturing and service industries contains several contributions. First, it provides 
evidence that family involvement creates SEW for family firms and that influences the families’ satisfaction 
with the firm. In this vein, the paper adds to the growing literature on family firms that looks at how SEW 
preservation motives drive the perceptions of family firms. Being able to control for the pure economic 
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performance of the firms, the results of this chapter may provide additional evidence to help understand 
the importance of the non-economic goals in the global satisfaction measure of family firms. Second, the 
chapter contributes to one of the central topics in the literature of family firms these days: the 
understanding of the heterogeneity of family firms. We note that the importance of SEW, and therefore the 
balance of economic and non-economic (i.e. SEW) goals, varies with generations. We argue that over 
generations SEW evolves and pure economic goals gain relevance, and therefore propose that the impact 
of past economic performance on satisfaction with the firm increases over generations. Third, it contributes 
to the scarce literature in the determinants of satisfaction with the business for firm owners. It is relevant to 
note that existing research has focused on satisfaction with firm economic performance. We do not restrict 
ourselves to economic performance but focus on general satisfaction with the firm, and therefore reflect 
satisfaction with both economic and non-economic (i.e. SEW) aspects of the firm. We also have found that 
when firms experience a decline in performance that may even put firm survival at stake, it may be 
advisable for them to focus scarce resources on core activities with more certain economic returns 
(Starbuck & Hedberg, 1977). In the case of family firms, Chrisman and Patel (2012) state, “as performance 
weakens, family firms are expected to frame decisions more negatively than non-family firms . . . , owing to 
the prospect of both economic losses and losses of socioemotional wealth” (p. 980). Therefore, the 
decisions made by family firms are more sensitive to declining performance than nonfamily firms. Thus, 
when performance declines, controlling families tend to pay more attention to economic terms, to the 
survival (March & Shapira, 1992) changing the weight of the components of their utility function and giving 
more importance to the economic part. Inside the family firms, we have found that only second and next 
generation are more similar to the non-family firms when the performance is declining. So, in some 
circumstances, the behavior of these family firms are more like the non-family ones. This paper establishes 
the heterogeneity of family firms’ strategies (Berrone, et al 2010) and thus the importance of paying closer 
attention to examining such strategic heterogeneity and explaining its sources in the family business 
research. 
Taken together all the chapters, we have shown the value and importance of SEW through different 
databases with different samples (vary in size of firms, combining primary and secondary data, public 
versus private firms and also geographically).  
Besides, the environment conditions in which the company moves, and the surrounding circumstances, are 
affecting the company outcomes. It seems that firm do not act in a vacuum and the role of the 
environmental and organizational context matters. Such environment seems to moderate the importance of 
SEW preservation preferences in family firms, and consequently family firm’s decision making. 
In addition, the heterogeneity family firm has been taken into consideration. For example, in Chapter 3 we 
suggest that while the SEW is treated as something monolithic, its elements can play different roles in 
different family businesses and their institutional and organizational contexts. That is, there may be some 
family firms that prioritize more control and ownership and others which pay more attention to the external 
image. In chapter 4, we also proved that family firms are heterogeneous between them (being the 
generation and the performance situation two important elements of this heterogeneity). The weight of non 
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economic goals will be lower in later generation and there are SEW dimensions such as the image and 
reputation that prioritize their focus on pure economic aspects of company performance. 
5.2 Limitations 
Our studies are not free for limitations. The limitations of each paper are illustrated in detail in the 
corresponding chapters. A few central ones could be emphasized here. As regards the first paper, data 
were collected in 2007, before the current economic crisis unraveled. While increased pressure to remain 
competitive in the current economic situation may push some family firms to become more 
entrepreneurially oriented, others may become more risk-averse in order to save existing resources and 
ensure survival. 
As we have shown in the chapter two the family firms do not constitute a homogeneous population 
(Salvato 2004; Gómez-Mejía et al. 2011). Thus, different types of family firms may present different EO 
patterns (Cruz and Nordqvist 2012; Kellermanns & Eddleston 2006) and in this chapter, based on the 
sample we have, we are not able to distinguish between generations. Moreover, while our research design 
considers EO a unidimensional construct (Covin & Wales 2012), it could also be conceptualized as a 
multidimensional construct (Wales et al. 2013) because there could be potential differences between family 
and non-family firms across the different dimensions in which EO has an impact. 
The third chapter was based on a more diversified and complete sample, focusing in different European 
countries and in a longitudinal data. However, they are only publicly held companies. While it is widely 
agreed that these companies are more exposed to institutional pressures, further studies should examine 
how family control issues and emotional bonds interact with CSR outcomes in the case of private family 
firms. Besides, our distance variable considered the United States as our reference point. We noted the 
use of country distances, as proxies for the relative presence of high standards for CSR, demands the 
selection of a reference country with high CSR standards. This limitation should be kept in mind when 
implementing this approach. We also ran our analyses taking a European country, the United Kingdom, as 
a reference. Results are very similar to those obtained when the United States was used as our 
benchmark. 
The fourth chapter used Spanish data from Spanish small and medium privately firms. Such information 
was collected in 2010. Hence, the data was obtained in a unique environmental context of economic and 
financial crisis. This added further difficulty to the already complex environment of firms in the high tech 
and medium-high tech industries, which is characterized by high degrees of dynamicity and stiff 
competition. This particularly harsh context may have reduced the latitude of action of firms, as well as 
influenced the impact of their decisions on subsequent firm performance. As it happens with the first study, 
the data is cross-sectional. Cross-sectional studies can suggest correlations but do not allow researchers 
to infer causal relationships or effects over time and the sample consists entirely of Spanish firms, thus, 
any inference to other countries must be made with caution. Country-specific cultural and traditional 
influences may reduce the generalizability of our findings.  
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A limitation shared by the three chapters is the inability to directly measure the SEW. Family ownership 
has been the most common proxy used to capture the intensity of SEW in prior studies and many articles 
in top journals have validated it (Berrone et al., 2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007, 2011). Moreover, as the 
concentration of company ownership in family hands increases, the family has greater influence over the 
firm’s strategic decisions (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Miller, Le Breton Miller, & Lester, 2010), reinforcing the 
control dimension of SEW, the level of personal attachment and identification, and the emotional bonds 
between family members and the firm (French & Rosenstein, 1984). In addition, as Berrone et al. (2012) 
argued, the percentage of shares owned by a family is “perhaps the only available alternative when using 
large archival databases” (p. 264). Additionally, controlling family influence over company affairs increases 
with the presence of at least one member on the board of directors (Anderson & Reeb). However, the 
degree of family identification, influence and personal investment in the firm changes as the company 
evolves across generations (Gersick et al., 1997; Schulze et al., 2003). As we have mentioned in chapter 
four, Dyer (1988) and McConaughy and Phillips (1999) note the differences between first and following 
generations in family firms. As noted in the introductory chapter, direct measure of SEW will be of 
particular interest in order to provide a more precise response to relevant research questions in the field of 
family firm. It is within our purpose to try to measure the SEW in a direct way, through a survey instrument 
that grounds in scales already proposed by renowned authors such as Berrone et al. 2010.  
5.3 Future research 
In continuing with my research of family firms behavior, the first objective we have in mind for the near 
future is, as we have just mentioned, to develop a survey instrument to obtain a more direct measure of 
SEW in family firms. This will further enhance our capability to expore the differences between family and 
non-family but also, the differences inside family. These future survey instrument will take into account 
different measures such as ownership, control, management and the generation involvement.  
The findings of the second chapter should encourage scholars to further investigate the impact of the 
multidimensional construct of EO in family firms. We believe that future research should also explore 
potential differences between family and non-family firms across the different dimensions in which EO has 
an impact in the subsequent effect in firm performance. Besides, Extensions should also consider the 
decisive role of moderating factors (Rauch et al. 2009).We have taken some initial steps in this direction by 
examining the moderating role of the technology intensity of the sector and firms’ economic difficulties, but 
there are others moderating factor, such as the generation involvement that could refine the results.  
The third chapter could inspire researchers to further investigate CSR and family firms’ relations in publicly 
owned companies examining how family control issues and emotional bonds interact with CSR outcomes 
in the case of private family firms. Moreover, private family firms are likely to useless formal internal and 
external practices. In fact, as we see it, the formality of social practices in the case of listed firms can be a 
valid response to an important stakeholder: the shareholders. Future studies should address what happens 
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to the relationship between family influence and CSR in contexts in which this formality is not required, as 
is the case of privately owned firms. 
Finally, future research could build on the findings of the fourth chapter by investigating differences in the 
satisfaction with the company among family firms, measured by different objective or subjective 
satisfaction measures, being able to capture both economic and emotional aspiration goals. For instant, 
Cooper y Artz (1995), in order to operationalize the satisfaction measure for entrepreneurs, asked 
respondents to assess several dimensions of satisfaction. Four of these items were used to measure 
entrepreneurial satisfaction. The first two assessed the entrepreneurs' satisfaction with their ventures' 
sales and with profits. Whereas these questions address specific performance areas, the third item asked 
respondents to assess their "personal overall satisfaction with their business". For each of these first three 
items, entrepreneurs were asked to compare their year 3 satisfaction to what they expected it to be when 
they started. The fourth survey item evaluated the entrepreneurs' willingness to start the same business 
again. Hence, this item also assessed the entrepreneurs' overall satisfaction with their ventures. A similar 
instrument that focuses on distinguishing economic and non-economic aspirational goals, may be valid to 
assess, as pointed above, the different impact that those goals have on overall satisfaction. 
5.4 Conclusions 
As a whole my work in the present dissertation demonstrates the importance of SEW for the study of family 
business. Any attempt to reach a better understanding of this particularly relevant type of firms, and how 
their decisions may deviate from those of non-family firms should take the SEW protection preferences of 
controlling families into account. This work shows the presence of these SEW protection prefernces in 
major strategic decisions of the family business, pointing how family firms balance these SEW protection 
objectives with the economic ones depending on certain circumstances. The dissertation has also 
ackhowledge that all the non-economic factors that are summarized within the SEW label may play 
different roles, and may vary with the generation of the controlling family. Importantly, the dissertation has 
showed the importance of SEW preservation goals in different types of firms and across different countries. 
Thus, taken together, the current dissertation constitutes an important step in increasing our general 
understanding of how family firms behave, opening up promising avenues for future research.  
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